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Abstract
Market frictions or market imperfections are diverse, broadly present in
most markets, and affect most transactions in the economy. These market
failures may prevent buyers and sellers from trading, even if they agree on
a price. This means that the central assumption of perfectly competitive
markets that markets clear fails to hold, and some buyers and sellers remain
unmatched.
Since the 1970s, a growing literature has emerged addressing the impor-
tance of market frictions in most markets of the economy, namely in the
labor, product, and credit markets. Information asymmetries, transaction
costs, heterogeneous preferences, and coordination failure are examples of
sources of market imperfections. In labor markets, these frictions imply that
firms possess some market power over their employees and that a one cent
wage cut does not lead all workers to leave the firm. In product markets, a
key ingredient for the sluggish price adjustment is coordination failure among
firms. Firms respond incompletely to an aggregate shock because other firms
have not yet responded. In turn, asymmetric information and costly contract
enforcement provide the foundations of credit market frictions, and are used
to explain credit rationing as a market equilibrium.
In Chapter 1 we use matched employer-employee data and firm balance
sheet data to investigate the importance of firm productivity and firm labor
market power in explaining firm heterogeneity in wage formation. We use
a linear regression model with one interacted high dimensional fixed effect
to estimate 5-digit sector-specific elasticity of output with respect to input
factors directly from the production function. This allows us to derive firm
specific price-cost mark-up and elasticity of labor supply. The results show
that firms possess a considerable degree of product and labor market power.
Furthermore, we find evidence that a firm’s monopsony power negatively af-
fects the earnings of its workers, and firm’s total factor productivity is closely
associated with higher earnings, ceteris paribus. We also find that firms use
monopsony power for wage differentiation between male and female workers.
Chapter 2 describes price setting behavior using a very rich dataset of pro-
ducer prices collected for Portuguese firms. The Industrial Producer Prices
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Index dataset is comprised of monthly transaction prices collected for prod-
ucts defined at a detailed level. We proceed with the analysis in two steps.
First, we estimate a hazard function model for the probability of a price
change with high dimensional fixed effects to extensively account for product-
and firm-specific time-invariant heterogeneity, splitting price changes between
price decreases and price increases. Second, we estimate a peer-effects model
to document how market competition affects firms’ price setting rules. The
results suggest that the likelihood of price adjustment depends on both id-
iosyncratic and sectoral conditions. Furthermore, when we fully account for
heterogeneity, duration dependence is estimated to be positive in the case
of both a price increase and price decrease. The results of the peer-effects
model suggest that firms timidly respond to their competitors’ price setting
behavior.
Chapter 3 examines the importance of credit demand and credit supply-
related factors in explaining the evolution of credit granted to Portuguese
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The results suggest that the
interest rate is a strong driver of SMEs’ demand for bank loans, as well as
their internal financing capacity. On the other hand, credit supply mostly
depends on firms’ ability to generate cash-flows and reimburse their debt, and
on the amount of collateral. The model was estimated for the period between
2010 and 2012. The results suggest that a considerable fraction of Portuguese
SMEs were affected by credit rationing in this period.
Keywords: labor market frictions, wage setting policy, high dimensional
fixed effects, gelbach decomposition, price rigidity, coordination failure, dura-
tion model, high dimensional fixed effects, peer effects, credit market frictions,
bank lending, financial crisis, disequilibrium model, SMEs
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at Banco de Portugal, Lúısa Farinha, for her care, motivation, and understanding,
and for directly contributing to the last chapter of this thesis.
I am grateful to Pedro Raposo for his encouragement and help. I thank my
friends for sharing this experience with me and for all the fun we have had in the
last years: Pedro Chaves, Christmas time was never the same without your (don’t
find the words to describe them) Christmas decorations in our office, Nuno Paixão
for the sleepless nights we spent working together at Nova, João Filipe and Gisele
Braun for being such good friends in our Ph.D. class, and Bernardo Pimentel for
thousands of shared coffees.
iii
I’d like to thank my family for supporting all my decisions and always being by
my side. To my dear mom, for every sacrifice you did for allowing me to get here,
thank you.
To little baby M, joy of my life, thanks for allowing mom to sleep well at least
some nights. To Eduardo, thank you for always believing in me, thinking of me as
better than I am, and celebrating every small achievement as if I had won the Nobel




1 Labor market imperfections and the firm’s wage setting policy 5
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 Theoretical framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.1 Perfect competition in the product and labor market . . . . . 9
1.2.2 Imperfect competition in the product market . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2.3 Monopsony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3 Data description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4 Product and labor market imperfections parameter . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.5 Total factor productivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.6 Wage regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.7 Estimation results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.7.1 Monopsony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.7.2 Efficient bargaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.7.3 The gender pay gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.8 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
v
2 Price setting and market competition 35
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.2 The data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.3 The survival function of price adjustment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.4 Empirical methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.4.1 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.4.2 Models with frailty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.5 Peer effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.5.1 Empirical methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.5.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3 Credit Rationing for Portuguese SMEs 59
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2 The demand and supply of credit: model and variables . . . . . . . . 62
3.2.1 The disequilibrium model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.2.2 Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.3 Some econometric questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.3.1 New loans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.3.2 Endogeneity and unobservable heterogeneity . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.4 Credit rationing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.5 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.6 Estimation results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.6.1 Disequilibrium model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.6.2 Credit rationing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
vi
Introduction
Market frictions or market imperfections are diverse, broadly present in most
markets, and affect most transactions in the economy. These market failures may
prevent buyers and sellers from trading, even if they agree on a price. This means
that the central assumption of perfectly competitive markets that markets clear fails
to hold, and some buyers and sellers remain unmatched in the market.
Until the 1970s, economists while recognizing the importance of market frictions
in real-world transactions did not incorporate market frictions in formal economic
models. Since then, a growing literature has emerged addressing the importance
of market frictions in most markets of the economy, namely in the labor, product,
and credit markets. Imperfect information about available jobs, moving and learning
costs, firm specific human capital, reputation costs, exploitation of rents, and worker
heterogeneous preferences are examples of sources of frictions in the labor market.
These market imperfections may generate upward sloping labor supply curves to a
particular firm. This is in line with the “new monopsony” literature popularized
by Manning (2003), in which firms possess some degree of market power and are
able to mark down their wages below the marginal revenue product. This means
that the assumption of a single market wage that would cause all employees to in-
stantaneously leave the firms after a one cent wage cut seems unrealistic. Moreover,
wages of workers with similar characteristics and working for similar firms show
considerable dispersion.
In business cycle models, frictions are used to explain the non-neutrality of mon-
etary shocks and the amplifying effects of demand shocks on output. A central
hypothesis for these findings has been the sluggish price adjustment to aggregate
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conditions. In this new class of macroeconomic models, an important source of
market incompleteness is coordination failure that leads firms to adjust their prices
incompletely because other firms have not responded yet to aggregate shocks. The
combination of sticky prices and coordination failure in product markets may am-
plify and generate long-lasting effects of demand shocks on output.
In credit markets, the seminal work of Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) show that in the
presence of credit market frictions, banks may decide not to grant credit to borrowers
with a high probability of default, even if they are willing to pay the respective
risk premium. Furthermore, information asymmetries, moral hazard, and adverse
selection problems may be so severe for some firms that credit rationing may arise
as an equilibrium.
The importance of frictions in driving market outcomes is crucial to understand
these markets and promoted a large number of empirical contributions. The increas-
ing availability of very detailed micro data allows researchers to study most of these
relations. It is the combination of economic theory and empirical testing that renders
economics fruitful. Economic theory promotes new research topics and leads to the
construction of new databases, while empirical results can challenge economic the-
ory, motivating new theories. This microeconomic evidence is of great importance
for drawing macroeconomic implications, making it of interest for policymakers.
This thesis contributes to the literature on labor, product, and credit market
frictions.
The first chapter was written in co-authorship with Pedro Portugal and stud-
ies the importance of labor market frictions and total factor productivity to explain
earnings of individuals. We depart from the central assumption of perfectly compet-
itive labor markets that markets clear, and show that firms possess a considerable
degree of labor market power, which is in contradiction with the general assumption
made by economists until the 1950s that labor power is given and not augmentable.
We use the high dimensional fixed effects estimation procedure proposed by Por-
tugal & Guimarães (2010) to estimate an empirical distribution of the firm-specific
product and labor markets imperfections parameters as directly estimated from the
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production function, following the theoretical framework developed by Dobbelaere &
Mairesse (2011). We proceed by estimating what must be one of the most common
regression equations in microeconomics, a Mincer wage equation augmented with
the estimated labor market imperfections parameters and firm-specific total factor
productivity. Furthermore, we apply the Gelbach’s methodology (Gelbach (2016))
to decompose the impact of the estimated firm’s wage setting power and firm’s total
factor productivity within the firm, worker, and job title dimensions. The results
suggest that the firm elasticity of labor supply is positively and significantly related
to wages, meaning that firms with more monopsonistic power pay lower wages, ce-
teris paribus. We also show that firm’s total factor productivity helps considerably
to explain heterogeneity in wage formation.
The second chapter describes price setting behavior using a very rich micro
dataset of producer prices collected for Portuguese firms. Macroeconomists have
been studying for a long time the large effects of demand shocks on output and,
in particular, the non-neutrality of the monetary policy on real output. A growing
empirical literature has emerged in the last decades documenting the large effects of
demand shocks on output (Blanchard & Perotti (2002), Ramey (2009), and Naka-
mura & Steinsson (2014)) and the non-neutrality of monetary shocks (Friedman
& Schwartz (2008), Christiano et al. (1999), Romer & Romer (2004)). A central
hypothesis for explaining these findings has been the sluggish price adjustment to
aggregate conditions. We proceed with the analysis in two steps. First, we estimate
a hazard function model for the probability of a price change with high dimensional
fixed effects to extensively account for product- and firm-specific time-invariant het-
erogeneity, splitting price changes between price decreases and price increases. Sec-
ond, we estimate a peer-effects model to document how market competition affects a
firm’s price setting rules. The results suggest that the likelihood of price adjustment
depends on both idiosyncratic and sectoral conditions. Furthermore, when we fully
account for heterogeneity, duration dependence is estimated to be positive in the
case of both a price increase and price decrease. The results of the peer-effects model
suggest that firms timidly respond to their competitors’ price setting behavior.
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The recent global financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt
crisis led to a surge of studies exploiting the effects of financial market frictions on
real economic activity. One of the strands of this literature focuses the bank lending
channel, specifically whether shocks to the financial position of a bank affect lending
supply. In Portugal, credit granted to firms tightened considerably since the onset of
the economic and financial crisis. Portuguese firms were affected by the significant
contraction of the economy and worse economic prospects, and banks were severely
affected by internacional financing restrictions and stronger capital requirements.
In this context, the reduction in lending was a result of increased restrictiveness in
credit standards and conditions applied to loans as well as of decreased demand by
firms. The seminal work of Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) presents a theoretical framework
for credit rationing as arising from adverse selection and moral hazard problems. In
fact, these market failures can be so severe that creditworthy small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) may not have access to credit mainly due to their reduced
capacity to provide collateral (Berger & Udell (2006) and Beck et al. (2010)).
The third and fourth chapters of this thesis are concerned with credit rationing for
Portuguese SMEs since the onset of the economic and financial crises.
The third chapter of this thesis, written in co-authorship with Lúısa Farinha, is
an evaluation of the relative contribution of demand and supply to explain credit
developments in Portugal since the onset of the economic and financial crises. We
consider a disequilibrium model based on microeconomic data to identify credit
restrictions for Portuguese SMEs, as these are expected to rely more on bank loans
and are, therefore, more vulnerable to credit rationing. The model assumes that the
credit market may be in disequilibrium, which means that the observed interest rate
does not ensure that credit demand is equal to credit supply. The results suggest
that approximately 15 percent of Portuguese SMEs were partially rationed while 32
percent of SMEs with no bank loans were fully rationed during the period between
2010 and 2012. These results are of great importance for policy makers due to the




Labor market imperfections and
the firm’s wage setting policy
1.1 Introduction
A central feature of perfectly competitive markets is that markets clear, meaning
that all workers with similar quality should be paid the same market clearing wage.
The assumption of a single market wage that would cause all employees to instanta-
neously leave the firm after a one cent wage cut seems unrealistic. Recent empirical
evidence suggests the presence of considerable wage dispersion among workers with
similar characteristics and among similar firms. Torres et al. (2012) use a longitu-
dinal matched employer-employee dataset for Portugal to estimate a wage equation
with three high-dimensional fixed effects and decompose the variation in real hourly
wages into three different components related to worker, firm, and job title hetero-
geneity. The authors find that worker permanent heterogeneity accounts for about
36 percent of wage variation, firm permanent effects account for almost 29 percent,
and job title effects are less important, although still explaining almost 10 percent
of wage variation.
The firm effects estimated in wage regressions can be thought of as arising from
distortions in the labor markets (Abowd et al. (1999b) and Goux & Maurin (1999)).
Search frictions in the labor market such as imperfect information on alternative
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available jobs (Burdett & Mortensen (1998) and Shimer (2005)), moving and learn-
ing costs (Boal & Ransom (1997)), firm specific human capital, reputation costs,
exploitation of rents, and worker heterogenous preferences namely over nonwage
job characteristics (Stevens (1994) and Bhaskar et al. (2002)) are sources of labor
market power, and help to explain why firms have market power and why the la-
bor supply curve faced by an individual firm is not perfectly elastic. These search
frictions in the labor market may generate upward sloping labor supply curves to
a particular firm. In a standard wage setting model this means that firms possess
some power to mark down their wages below the marginal revenue product. This
is in line with the “new monopsony” literature popularized by Manning (2003), in
which employers gain some market power derived from search frictions when setting
wages. Monopsony is not understood in the traditional sense of a unique employer
in the labor market, but instead as synonymous with imperfect competition, monop-
sonistic competition, upward sloping labor supply curve to the firm, or finite labor
supply elasticity. A particular firm may face an upward labor supply curve even if
there is no concentration on the demand side of the market.
Recent empirical literature provides robust evidence consistent with the exis-
tence of monopsony power and upward-sloping labor supply curves to individual
firms. There is considerable heterogeneity in the estimated labor supply elasticity.
Ransom & Oaxaca (2010), Hirsch et al. (2010), and Weber (2013) estimate the labor
supply elasticity to range between 1 to 10. Dobbelaere & Mairesse (2011) estimate a
production function for 38 French manufacturing industries and derive product and
labor market imperfection parameters as a wedge between the factor elasticities and
their corresponding shares in revenue. Then, the authors classify each industry into
six different regimes according to the type of competition in the product and the
labor market (perfect vs. imperfect competition in the product market and efficient
bargaining vs. right to manage or perfect competition vs. monopsonistic compe-
tition in the labor market). Their analysis of the within-regime firm heterogeneity
through the Swamy methodology suggests considerable dispersion in the estimated
price-cost mark-up and rent-sharing or labor supply elasticity parameters. Depew
& Sørensen (2013) use employee records from Ford Motors in Michigan and A. M.
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Byers in Pennsylvania and find that the workers’ labor supply elasticity to a firm
is counter-cyclical so that monopsony power is pro-cyclical. The estimates of the
labor supply elasticity to the firm are typically between 4 during expansions and 1.6
during recessions.
The primary contribution of this study is twofold: first, we estimate a measure
of labor supply elasticity to the firm directly from the production function and at
a very granular level (by estimating a standard production function using the one-
iterative high dimensional estimation procedure and considering the 5-digit sector
variable as interaction variable), which allows us to account for the heterogeneity
across and within labor markets in the analysis; second, and to the best of our
knowledge, this is the first study that disentangles the importance of firm’s wage
setting power and firm’s total factor productivity to explain the firm’s wage setting
policies.
In this study we use employer-employee matched data and firm balance sheet
data to obtain an empirical distribution of the firm-specific product and labor market
imperfection parameters as directly estimated from the production function, follow-
ing the theoretical framework developed by Dobbelaere (2004) and Dobbelaere &
Mairesse (2011) and using the high dimensional fixed effects estimation procedure
proposed by Portugal & Guimarães (2010). We proceed by estimating the impact of
monopsony power on the firm’s wage setting policy by plugging the estimated labor
supply elasticity and the firm total factor productivity in a Mincer wage equation.
We also estimate the importance of rent-sharing to explain wage formation within
the efficient bargaining setting. Furthermore, we use the Gelbach’s methodology
(Gelbach (2016)) to decompose the impact of the estimated labor supply elasticity
on wages within the firm, worker, and job title dimensions.
In fact, little empirical literature can be found on the effects of monopsonistic
competition on earnings of individuals. Weber (2013) estimates firm-level labor
supply elasticities for the U.S. labor market through an extension of the dynamic
model of labor supply proposed by Manning (2003) and examines the effects of
monopsonistic competition on the earnings distribution. The author provides evi-
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dence of substantial heterogeneity in the market power possessed by firms and shows
a positive relationship between the firm’s labor supply elasticity and the wages of
its workers. The author estimates that the impact of a one unit increase in a firm’s
labor supply elasticity is associated with an increase in earnings that ranges from 5
to 16 percent.
We find strong evidence that the firm elasticity of labor supply is positively and
significantly related to wages, meaning that firms with more monopsonistic power
pay on average lower wages, ceteris paribus. We also find that the elasticity of labor
supply to the firm affects wages differently according to the gender of workers, which
reveals the importance of considering the firm’s labor market power when studying
the wage pay gap between women and men. In turn, and surprisingly, our results
suggest that firms with higher relative extent of rent-sharing pay lower wages. We
also show that firm productivity helps considerably to explain heterogeneity in wage
formation in both labor market settings.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we briefly present the theo-
retical framework. This is followed by a discussion of the data used in the empirical
analysis and the estimation procedure. Sections 1.4 and 1.5 report the results on
the estimation of the labor and product market imperfection parameters and firm’s
total factor productivity, respectively. Section 1.6 presents the wage regressions.
Section 1.7 discusses the results and Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Theoretical framework
We closely follow Dobbelaere & Mairesse (2011) to jointly estimate product and
labor market imperfections as a wedge between factor elasticities for labor and ma-
terials in the production function and their corresponding shares in revenue. This
approach extends the framework of Hall (1988) abstaining from the assumption of
perfect competition in the labor market and builds on the estimation of the firm
price-cost mark-up and rent-sharing parameters directly from the production func-
tion. The analysis relies crucially on the assumption that output elasticities of labor
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and materials are equal to their revenue shares when prices equal the marginal cost
of production.
We consider a production function Qft “ ΘftF pNft,Mft, Kftq, where Qft rep-
resents physical output of firm f in period t, and F(.) is a function of labor Nft,
materials Mft, and capital Kft. The term Θft “ A exppηf ` νt`uftq is the Hicksian
neutral shift of firm f in period t, ηf is an unobserved firm-specific time-invariant
effect, νt is a set of time effects, and uft is a firm-year idiosyncratic disturbance term
with the conventional properties.
Taking natural logarithms on both sides of the production function and denoting
qft, lft, mft, kft, and θft the logarithm of Qft, Nft, Mft, Kft, and Θft, respectively,
results in a linear production function
qft “ pεNqftnft ` pεMqftmft ` pεKqftkft ` θft, (1.1)
where εJ (J=N, M, K) is the factor-cost elasticity of output with respect to input
factor J .
1.2.1 Perfect competition in the product and labor market
In perfectly competitive labor and product markets, in which firms are price-










where wft and jft represent labor and material factor prices, respectively, and Pft is
the price of output. Therefore, pαNqft and pαMqft are the firm shares of labor and
material costs in total revenue, respectively.
Assuming that the elasticity of scale is known (λ), the elasticity of capital can
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be written as:
pεKqft “ λft ´ pαNqft ´ pαMqft. (1.2)
Then, combining equation (1.2) with equation (1.1) yields:
qft ´ kft “ pαNqftrnft ´ kfts ` pαMqftrmft ´ kfts ` rλft ´ 1skft ` θft. (1.3)
1.2.2 Imperfect competition in the product market
Perfectly competitive labor market
In turn, if firms act as price-setters in the product market but price-takers in the
input factor markets, profit maximization leads to:
pεNqft “ µftpαNqft (1.4)




ą 1 refers to the mark-up of price (P ) over marginal cost (CQ).
In this setting, the capital-output elasticity can be written as:
pεKqft “ λft ´ µftpαNqft ´ µftpαMqft, (1.6)
and equation (1.3) can be rewritten as:
qft ´ kft “ µft
“
pαNqftrnft ´ kfts ` pαMqftrmft ´ kfts
‰
` rλft ´ 1skft ` θft. (1.7)
Therefore, the mark-up of price over marginal cost can be estimated using the
previous equation1.
1In the right-to-manage bargaining framework, the firm can bargain with risk-neutral workers
over wages but retains the right to set employment afterwards unilaterally. Since the firm uniquely
sets the amount of labor and material inputs to contract, this is equivalent to perfect competition
in the labor market and equation (1.7) still provides an estimate of the mark-up µft.
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Efficient bargaining
In this setting, risk-neutral workers and the firm bargain over wages and em-
ployment. Workers maximize Upwft, Nftq “ Nftpwft ´ w̄ftq where w̄ft ă wft is the
reservation wage. Given that capital is assumed to be quasi-fixed, the firm wants to
maximize short-run profits Πft “ Rft ´wftNft ´ jftMft, where Rft “ PftQft is the





φfttRft ´ wftNft ´ jftMftu
1´φft . (1.8)
The first-order condition for material input is given by equation (1.5) because
material input is unilaterally determined by the firm. Setting the relative extent of
rent-sharing equal to γft “ φft{p1´φftq and denoting the marginal revenue product
of labor as pRNqft, the first-order conditions with respect to wage and labor are,
respectively,
wft “ w̄ft ` γft
„




wft “ pRNqft ` φft
„




which yield the following contract curve:
pRNqft “ w̄ft. (1.11)
Given that in equilibrium µft “
Pft
pRQqft
, where pRQqft is the marginal revenue,
the marginal revenue of labor can be expressed as the product of marginal revenue
and marginal product of labor, pQNqft:















which is equivalent to:
pεNqft “ µftpαNqft ´ µftγftr1´ pαNqft ´ pαMqfts. (1.14)
The previous equation shows that employment does not directly depend on the
bargained wage. The elasticity of capital is given by:
pεKqit “ λ´ µitpαNqit ` µitγitr1´ pαNqit ´ pαMqits ´ µitpαMqit, (1.15)
and the corresponding modified production function can be expressed as:
qft ´ kft “ pεNqftrnft ´ kfts ` pεMqftrmft ´ kfts ` rλft ´ 1skft ` θft. (1.16)
This equation allows the identification of the mark-up of price over marginal cost
as well as the labor market imperfections parameter as measured by the extent of
rent-sharing parameter.
The authors derive a joint market imperfections parameter (ψ) through the com-
parison between the factor elasticities as directly estimated from the production
function and the factor shares for labor and materials. The sign and significance























If ψ is positive, then an efficient bargaining model prevails and we can derive
estimates for the price-cost mark-up and the (absolute and relative) extent of rent-
sharing parameters. In this case the worker obtains a wage higher than her marginal
revenue and, therefore, the ratio between the output elasticity of labor and the share
of labor costs in revenue becomes smaller than the respective ratio for materials.
1.2.3 Monopsony
In this study we analyze the importance of firm labor market power in explaining
the wage setting policy followed by firms, and we therefore focus our analysis on
the monopsony regime. The theoretical framework for the monopsony model can be
described as follows. Consider a firm that operates under imperfect competition in
the product market and faces a labor supply Nftpwftq. Nft, the labor supply curve
of the individual firm, is an increasing function of the wage, wft. The short-run
profit function for the monopsonist firm taking the labor supply as given is:
max
Nft,Mft
Πpwft, Nft,Mftq “ RftpNft,Mftq ´ wftpNftqNft ´ jftMft. (1.19)
The first-order condition with respect to the material input leads to pRMqft “ jft
with the marginal revenue of materials pRMqft equal to the price of materials jft
(equation (1.5)). The first-order condition with respect to the labor input is given
by:




where pεwqft P R` is the wage elasticity of the labor supply. The firm’s degree of
monopsony power can be measured by
pRN qft
wft
, and therefore the more inelastic the
labor supply, the larger the gap between the marginal revenue of labor and the wage.
This means that the monopsony power depends negatively on the elasticity of the
labor supply.









Then, under monopsony, estimating equation (1.16) yields an estimate of the
mark-up of price over marginal cost and of the labor supply elasticity to the firm.











In this setting we expect ψ to be negative and labor market frictions to generate
upward-sloping labor supply curves to individual firms giving some degree of market
power to employers. In the monopsony setting, the marginal employee receives a
wage that is less than her marginal revenue.
1.3 Data description
In the first part of this study we use the Portuguese dataset Simplified Corporate
Information - IES (Informação Empresarial Simplificada) - which covers the popu-
lation of virtually all Portuguese nonfinancial corporations2. Data are compiled and
disseminated by Statistics Portugal (Instituto Nacional de Estat́ıstica (INE)) and
consists of a new system to collect firm mandatory annual economic, financial, and
accounting information for a single moment and a single entity.
Firms report detailed balance sheet information as well as information on several
important variables, namely employment and transactions of goods and services by
geographical area. Even though data on IES started being collected in 2006, there
was a report collecting data in 2005 that was also taken into consideration in the
analysis. We obtain an unbalanced panel of nonfinancial Portuguese firms spanning
eight years. We restrict our sample to manufacturing firms with at least six years of
2The sampling method consists of non-financial corporations covering all sectors of activity de-
fined in the Portuguese Classification of Economic Activities with the following exceptions: finan-
cial intermediation, general government, private households with employed persons, international
organizations, and other non-resident institutions.
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observations for identification purposes. We consider only observations with nonzero
sales and capital, employing at least one worker, and observations with factor shares
of labor or materials inside the unit interval. Also, we consider 1 and 99 percentiles
as cutoff levels for output and input growth rates. We use sales as the measure of
output (Q), labor is the average number of employees (N), capital is the net book
value of fixed assets (K), and material is intermediate consumption (M).
The main descriptive statistics of the variables included in the analysis are re-
ported in Table 1.1. The shares of labor and materials in output are obtained by
dividing the firm total labor cost and intermediate consumption, respectively, by
the firm production as measured by firm sales.
Table 1.1: Main summary statistics
2006-2012
Mean St. Dev. Q1 Q2 Q3
∆q: Output growth 0.015 0.261 -0.115 0.014 0.143
∆n: Labor input growth -0.004 0.221 -0.065 0.000 0.061
∆m: Materials input growth 0.004 0.329 -0.152 0.010 0.165
∆k: Capital input growth -0.045 0.417 -0.220 -0.078 0.051
αn: Share of labor costs 0.307 0.172 0.184 0.280 0.393
αm: Share of materials 0.584 0.182 0.484 0.606 0.714
1´ αn ´ αm: Share of capital 0.109 0.082 0.051 0.090 0.145
Solow Residual (SR) 0.015 0.159 -0.057 0.009 0.079
Notes: The sampling period goes from 2006 to 2012. The number of observations is 127,869. The
variables ∆q, ∆n, ∆m, and ∆k represent the annual growth rates of output, labor, materials, and
capital, respectively, in the sampling period. The variables αn, αm, and αk “ 1 ´ αn ´ αm are
the shares of labor, materials, and capital averaged over adjacent periods. The Solow residual is
calculated as follows: SR=∆q ´αn∆n´αm∆m´ p1´αn´αmq∆k. Q1 and Q3 correspond to the
first and third quartiles and Q2 corresponds to the median.
Then, in the second part of this study we merge the estimated firm labor supply
elasticity and firm total factor productivity with a matched employer-employee-
job title dataset known as Quadros de Pessoal (Personnel Records). This dataset
was created by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment and is an annual mandatory
employment survey addressed to establishments employing at least one wage earner.
15
Data are available from 1986 to 2012 for each wage earner, with the exception of
workers of the Public Administration sector and domestic servants.
Detailed data are available on the establishment (location, economic activity,
and employment), the firm (location, economic activity, employment, sales, year of
formation, and legal framework), and for each and every of its workers (gender, age,
education, occupation, earnings - base wage, seniority-related earnings, other regular
and irregular benefits, overtime pay, normal and overtime hours, and tenure)3.
To estimate a Mincerian wage equation we considered a subset of these variables
and some restrictions were imposed in the dataset. We restricted the analysis to full-
time workers who were aged between 18 and 65 years old, and who earn a nominal
wage of at least 80 percent of the mandatory minimum wage. Also, we excluded from
the analysis workers from the agriculture and fishery sectors. Finally, we dropped
around two percent of the observations that did not belong to the largest connected
set. The dependent variable considered in the estimation is the natural logarithm
of the real hourly wage.
1.4 Product and labor market imperfections parameter
The baseline model formulated to derive the product and labor market imper-
fection parameters is presented in equation (1.16). We directly estimate from the
production function the labor and material output elasticities to derive the joint im-
perfections parameter as the difference between the output elasticity-revenue share
ratio for labor and materials. The sign and significance of this parameter will de-
termine which regime applies. Dobbelaere & Mairesse (2011) use the Swamy (1970)
methodology and document considerable within-regime firm differences in the esti-
mated product and labor markets imperfection parameters.
We believe production function estimates differ across firms due to firms’ id-
iosyncratic heterogeneity and heterogeneity in the product and labor markets they
operate in. Hence, in this study we resort to an empirical methodology that allows
3For a more detailed description of the dataset Quadros de Pessoal see Torres et al. (2012), for
example.
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us to derive a distribution of the labor and product markets imperfection param-
eters through the estimation of 5-digit sector-specific factor elasticities. The esti-
mation uses the high dimensional fixed effects procedure developed by Portugal &
Guimarães (2010) to compute the elasticity of output with respect to labor, ma-
terials, and capital through the estimation of a linear regression model with one
interacted high dimensional fixed effect. The high dimensional fixed effect consid-
ered in the analysis is the 5-digit classification of economic activities. This level of
disaggregation of the economic activity leads us to believe that we are close to the
firm definition. In this way we are able to draw a distribution of the 5-digit sector
estimated output elasticities of labor, materials and capital as directly estimated
from the production function. Then, we can obtain an estimate for the firm-specific
joint market imperfections parameter and derive firm-specific estimates of the price-
cost mark-up and labor market imperfection parameters. The baseline empirical
specification to be estimated considers constant returns to scale4 (λft “ 1) and is
given by:
qft ´ kft “ pεNqsrnft ´ kfts ` pεMqsrmft ´ kfts ` θft. (1.23)
Hence, the output elasticity for capital is given by pεKqs “ 1´ pεNqs ´ pεMqs.
The distribution of the estimates for the elasticities of labor, materials, and
capital with respect to output obtained through the estimation of the production
function presented in equation (1.23) are shown in Figure 1.1. These figures show
considerable dispersion in the estimated output elasticities.
These firm-level estimates are then considered to calculate a distribution of the
joint market imperfections parameter5. The results are depicted in Figure 1.2. This
figure shows that many firms in the sample are characterized by an efficient bar-
gaining model ( pψf ą 0), while several others are classified as a monopsony ( pψf ă 0).
4The estimation results should be robust to this assumption since the first-order conditions do








, where ppεM qs and ppεN qs are the 5-digit sector-specific output elasticities of
materials and labor, respectively, estimated from the production function, and pᾱN qf and pᾱM qf
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of 5-digit sector estimated elasticities of labor, materials,
and capital with respect to output weighted by the firm average number of employ-
ees.
In the first case, workers are assumed to receive a wage that exceeds their marginal
revenue, while in the second case workers receive a wage that is less than their
marginal revenue6.
Once the regime is identified we can compute the product and labor market im-
perfections parameters as measured by the firm price-cost mark-up and rent-sharing
or monopsony power, respectively. The empirical distribution of the estimated firm
price-cost mark-up7 is shown in Figure 1.3, and suggests that a great number of
firms operate in an imperfect competitive product market. Therefore, the estimates
suggest that firms possess a considerable degree of market power in the product
market.
In this study we focus the analysis on firms that possess some degree of monop-
sony power ( pψf ă 0) and explore the distribution of the estimated labor supply
elasticity to a particular firm. The results for the firm labor supply elasticity pβf
8
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of firm estimated joint market imperfections parameter
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of firm estimated price-cost mark-up (pµf ) weighted by the





are shown in Figure 1.4. We find evidence for imperfect competi-
tion in the labor market with considerable dispersion in the estimated labor supply
elasticity across firms even within the same labor market. The empirical distribu-
tions of the absolute and relative extent of rent-sharing (pφf and pγf , respectively)
calculated for firms in the efficient bargaining setting ( pψ ă 0) are depicted in Figure
1.5. The results show considerable dispersion in the extent of rent-sharing within
the efficient bargaining setting. The main descriptive statistics of the estimated
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Figure 1.4: Distribution of firm estimated elasticity of labor supply (pβf and ppεwqf )
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Figure 1.5: Distribution of firm estimated absolute (pφf ) and relative (pγf ) extent of
rent-sharing weighted by the firm average number of employees.
Table 1.2: Main summary statistics: Labor and product markets imperfections
parameters
2006-2012
Mean St.Dev. Q1 Q2 Q3
Joint markets imperfections parameter ( pψ) 0.091 0.769 -0.357 0.157 0.597
Price-cost mark-up (pµ) 1.226 0.330 1.002 1.146 1.359
Wage elasticity of labor supply (pεw) 3.271 4.228 0.767 1.624 3.824
Relative extent of rent-sharing (pγ) 2.166 2.057 0.666 1.433 2.981
Notes: The sampling period goes from 2006 to 2012. Q1 and Q3 correspond to the first and
third quartiles and Q2 corresponds to the median. The descriptive statistics of the joint markets
imperfections parameter and the price-cost mark-up are based on 109,812 observations. The ef-
ficient bargaining and the monopsony parameters are based on 63,539 and 46,620 observations,
respectively.
These results show that some firms possess a considerable degree of product
and labor market power and confirm that the hypothesis of perfectly competitive
product and labor markets is not suitable to characterize these markets.
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1.5 Total factor productivity
The total factor productivity (TFP) is estimated through the following equation:
Qft “ εNNft ` εMMft ` εKKft ` ηf ` νst ` uft, (1.24)
where ηf accounts for time-invariant observed and unobserved firm heterogeneity,
νst is a 5-digit sector s specific time trend that allows us to control for sector-specific
productivity shocks, and uit is a residual component. Therefore, firm-level TFP is
given by Θft “ A exppηf ` νst ` uftq. The results of the high dimensional fixed
effects estimation (see Portugal & Guimarães (2010) for details on the estimation
procedure) are reported in Table 1.39. Figure 1.6 depicts the distribution of firm
TFP weighted by the number of employees. Our results are in line with earlier
literature showing considerable variation in the productivity of Portuguese firms,
with a large number of firms being relatively low productive and a small number of
firms being more productive.







Notes: The sampling period goes from 2006 to 2012. The dependent variable is the natural
logarithm of sales. Materials refers to firm’s intermediate consumption, labor is measured by the
average number of employees, and capital is the net book value of the tangible assets. Linear
regression estimation with two high dimensional fixed effects: firm fixed effects and time fixed
effects interacted with 5-digit sector dummies.
9We also estimate this model using the two semi-parametric approaches proposed by Olley &
Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn & Petrin (1999). The first uses the firm’s investment decision to proxy
for the unobserved time-varying productivity shock to account for the problem of simultaneity, and
considers survival probabilities to address the problem of selectivity. The second is similar but uses
the intermediate inputs to proxy for unobservable variables. The results are very similar to those
obtained through the high dimensional fixed effects estimation with firm fixed effects and year
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Figure 1.6: Kernel density estimate of firm TFP weighted by the firm average num-
ber of employees.
1.6 Wage regressions
Empirical evidence reported in recent decades suggests the presence of consider-
able variability in wages (Abowd et al. (1999b), Abowd et al. (1999a) and Cardoso
et al. (2016)). Researchers have estimated wage regressions incorporating both
worker effects and firm effects with the goal of disentangling the effects of worker
decisions and firm wage policies in wage formation. More recently, Torres et al.
(2012) use Portuguese longitudinal matched employer-employee data to estimate a
wage regression and add job title heterogeneity as an important third dimension of
wage formation. In fact, the characteristics of some tasks (namely, the risk of fatal
or serious accidents, the workplace conditions in which the tasks are performed,
and the specific training or skills that some tasks require) contribute to wage differ-
entiation. The wage decomposition shows that in Portugal, firm, worker, and job
title time-invariant heterogeneity accounts for a significant fraction of the total wage
variation. The authors estimate that worker permanent heterogeneity is the primary
source of wage variation, accounting for approximately 36 per cent, followed by firm
permanent effects, which account for almost 29 per cent of the total wage variation.
The job title permanent heterogeneity plays a less significant but non-negligible role,
explaining close to 10 per cent of wage variation.
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The presence of frictions in the labor market may explain why wages vary across
labor markets and even across firms within a given labor market. In this section
we explore the importance of the firm-specific degree of monopsony power and firm
total factor productivity in explaining wage formation. Furthermore, we study the
contribution of rent-sharing for wage formation. We pick the estimates of the labor
supply elasticity and relative extent of rent-sharing as obtained in Section 1.4, and
combine these with firm-level productivity as calculated in Section 1.5.
Next we present the methodology applied in this study to understand the impor-
tance of monopsony power, relative extent of rent-sharing, and total factor produc-
tivity in explaining the firm wage setting policy. First, we follow Torres et al. (2012)
and estimate a standard Mincerian wage equation with the inclusion of three high
dimensional fixed effects to account for firm, worker, and job-title time-invariant
observed and unobserved heterogeneity:
lnwifjt “ Xiftβ ` φi ` γf ` ωj ` τt ` εifjt, (1.25)
where the dependent variable lnwifjt is the natural logarithm of the real hourly
wage of worker i (i “ 1, ..., N) working at firm f (f “ 1, ..., F q with the job title j
(j “ 1, ..., J) in year t (t “ 1, ..., T ). The vector Xift is a row-vector of k observed
characteristics of the worker i and firm f (and includes the quadratic terms on age
and tenure within the firm and the worker qualifications). The term φi is a worker
fixed effect, γf is a firm fixed effect, ωj is a job fixed effect, and τt is a set of year
dummies. The disturbance term εifjt has the conventional properties.
This equation is estimated using the Quadros de Pessoal matched employer-
employee data for the period between 1986 and 2012 and applying the iterative
algorithm developed by Portugal & Guimarães (2010), which produces the exact
solution of the least squares estimation of equations with three high dimensional
fixed effects. From the estimation of this equation we obtain the estimated firm pγf ,
worker pφi, and job title pωj fixed effects, which represent firm, worker, and job title
time-invariant observed and unobserved heterogeneity, respectively.
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Then, we combine the estimates of the labor supply elasticities and total fac-
tor productivity computed in the previous sections with the Quadros de Pessoal
dataset10. We proceed by applying the Gelbach’s exact decomposition (Gelbach
(2016)) to quantify the importance of the firm monopsony power and total factor
productivity to explain total wage variation11.
The base specification is given by:
lnwift “ α0 ` α1 zLMIft ` α2pΘft `Xiftξ ` τt ` ϑit, (1.26)
where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the real hourly wage (lnwit)
and the explanatory variables are the estimated labor market imperfection (zLMIft)
parameter, which is the firm’s monopsony power (1/ppεwqf ) in the case of monopsonist
firms and the relative extent of rent-sharing (pγft) in the case of firms in the efficient
bargaining setting, the estimated firm total factor productivity (pΘft), and a vector of
explanatory variables Xift (quadratic terms on age and tenure, worker qualifications,
and worker gender). The term τt is a vector of year dummies and ϑit is a disturbance
term with the conventional properties.
In turn, the full specification is given by the following equation:
lnwifjt “ a0 ` a1 ˆ zLMIft ` a2pΘft `Xiftβ ` pφi ` pγf ` pωj ` τt ` εifjt, (1.27)
where pφi, pγf , and pωj are the estimated worker, firm, and job-title time-invariant
heterogeneity.
10We end with a four-dimensional panel data (firm, worker, job-title, and year dimensions)
spanning from 2006 to 2012, since the labor market imperfection parameters and the total factor
productivity are estimated using the IES information, which is available only for this period.




The estimation results of equation (1.26) are reported in columns (1) and (2) of
Table 1.4. According to these estimates, the elasticity of labor supply is positively
and significantly associated with wages. Since the elasticity of labor supply is in-
versely related to monopsony power, this means that firms with more market power
manage to pay lower wages to their workers. The estimates presented in column
(2) suggest that a one standard deviation increase in firm’s monopsony power leads
earnings of workers to decrease by approximately 2 percent, ceteris paribus. Also,
we find that more productive firms pay on average higher wages, holding everything
else constant. It is interesting to notice that the elasticity of labor supply to the
firm and the firm total factor productivity alone explain a considerable fraction of
the variation in the earnings of its workers (approximately 39 percent).
To shed further light on the importance of market power and productivity to
explain the wage policy of the firm as measured by the firm time-invariant hetero-
geneity, we proceed with the Gelbach’s decomposition. The estimation results of
the full model presented in equation (1.27) are reported in column (3) of Table 1.4.
Then, in columns (1), (2), and (3) of Table 1.5 we find the decomposition of the wage
differential given by the difference between the estimates of the base and full models
reported in columns (2) and (3) of Table 1.4, respectively. The results suggest that,
in fact, monopsony power is mostly related to the firm permanent heterogeneity.
This reveals the role of monopsony power and firm’s total factor productivity to
explain heterogeneity in wage formation, even after controlling for detailed firm,
worker, and job title characteristics. This is in line with the suggestion of Goux &
Maurin (1999) and Abowd et al. (1999b) that the presence of firm effects in wage
regressions, after controlling for person and industry characteristics, is strongly sug-
gestive of market power. The coefficients of firm’s monopsony power and firm’s
productivity converge to zero in the case of the worker and job title permanent
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Table 1.4: Monopsony power and total factor productivity
(1) (2) (3)
lnwifjt lnwifjt lnwifjt
Monopsony power (1{ppεwqf ) -0.0234
˚˚˚ -0.0108˚˚˚ -0.0002˚˚
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001)













Constant -2.4622˚˚˚ -2.4366˚˚˚ 0.1232˚˚˚
(0.0058) (0.0069) (0.0047)
Fixed effects No No Yes
Observations 1,022,391 1,022,391 1,022,391
Adjusted R2 0.391 0.546 0.889
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of real hourly wage (lnwifjt). The sampling
period goes from 2006 to 2012. All specifications include year dummies and dummy variables for
education levels. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation with bootstrap standard errors (using




Table 1.5: Gelbach decomposition
(1) (2) (3)
pγf pφi pωj
Monopsony power (1{ppεwqf ) -0.0112
˚˚˚ 0.0015˚˚˚ -0.0009˚˚˚
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Total factor productivity (pθft) 0.3886
˚˚˚ 0.0173˚˚˚ -0.0023˚˚˚
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0003)
Observations 1,022,391 1,022,391 1,022,391
Adjusted R2 0.593 0.376 0.359
Notes: The dependent variable is the firm, worker, and job title time-invariant heterogeneity
in columns (1), (2), and (3), respectively. The sampling period goes from 2006 to 2012. All
specifications include year dummies and dummy variables for education levels. Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) estimation with bootstrap standard errors (using 1000 draws) in parentheses. ***,
**, and * stand for statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
1.7.2 Efficient bargaining
The contributions of the relative extent of rent-sharing parameter and total factor
productivity to explain wage formation are presented in Table 1.6. The estimates
related to the role of total factor productivity in explaining wages are consistent
with those obtained in the previous section and show that total factor productivity
is a crucial determinant of wage heterogeneity.
Based on the standard collective bargaining literature, we would expect a pos-
itive correlation between the relative extent of rent-sharing parameter and wages.
However, the estimation results suggest a negative impact of the relative extent of
rent-sharing on wages and therefore workers with a larger share of the rents fail to
obtain extra income. Instead, a larger share of the rents is estimated to depress the
wages paid by the firm.
While not intuitive, this result is similar to the results presented in Dobbelaere
& Mairesse (2011). The authors estimate the correlation between the relative extent
12These results are robust to using different criteria to characterize firms according to the labor
market setting, namely using a statistical significance criterion.
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Table 1.6: Efficient bargaining and total factor productivity
(1) (2) (3)
lnwifjt lnwifjt lnwifjt
Relative extent of rent-sharing (pγft) -0.0279
˚˚˚ -0.0130˚˚˚ -0.0007˚˚˚
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)













Constant -2.3529˚˚˚ -2.4728˚˚˚ 0.1180˚˚˚
(0.0069) (0.0076) (0.0047)
Fixed effects No No Yes
Observations 838,563 838,563 838,563
Adjusted R2 0.382 0.542 0.884
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of real hourly wage (lnwifjt). The sampling
period goes from 2006 to 2012. All specifications include year dummies and dummy variables for
education levels. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation with bootstrap standard errors (using
1000 draws) in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
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of rent-sharing and firm size, capital intensity, among other firm variables, and also
find a negative correlation between these variables.
1.7.3 The gender pay gap
Monopsonistic competition may help to explain one of the stylized empirical re-
sults in the labor economics literature, which is the gender pay gap. Ransom &
Oaxaca (2010) and Hirsch et al. (2010) investigate women’s and men’s labor supply
to the firm separately using a dynamic model of monopsony and find that women
have lower elasticities than men. The reasons for this result may be different prefer-
ences over nonwage job characteristics (namely, hours of work and job location) and
a higher degree of worker immobility. Monopsonist employers may take advantage
of this lower female elasticity of labor supply to the firm and pay lower wages to
women, ceteris paribus. Hirsch et al. (2010) suggest that this result implies that at
least one-third of the gender pay gap might be wage discrimination by monopsonist
employers13.
These differences in the labor supply elasticity between women and men suggest
that it is likely that the marginal impact of increasing the elasticity of labor supply
at the firm level may differ considerably across these two groups. Since in our model
monopsony power is inversely related to the labor supply elasticity at the firm level,
this means that the ability of monopsonist firms to mark down wages is greater in
the case of female workers. In fact, in our sample the average estimated labor supply
elasticity for female and male workers is approximately 1.95 and 2.316, respectively.
This means that firms hiring a large fraction of male workers have on average less
monopsony power.
Table 1.7 presents the results of the estimation of equation (1.26) separately for
male and female workers. These results make it clear that the marginal impact of
increasing the labor supply elasticity to a particular firm is much lower for female
workers and that there are considerable differences in how market power on the
13This explanation aligns with the Robinsonian monopsony model of wage discrimination (Robin-
son (1933)).
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firms’ side affects workers’ wages.
Table 1.7: Monopsony power and total factor productivity by gender
By gender
All Male Female
Monopsony power (1{ppεwqf ) -0.0108
˚˚˚ -0.0152˚˚˚ -0.0058˚˚˚
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Total factor productivity (pθft) 0.4075
˚˚˚ 0.4190˚˚˚ 0.3834˚˚˚
(0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0014)
Age 0.0290˚˚˚ 0.0349˚˚˚ 0.0201˚˚˚
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Age2 -0.0002˚˚˚ -0.0003˚˚˚ -0.0001˚˚˚
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Tenure 0.0158˚˚˚ 0.0174˚˚˚ 0.0127˚˚˚
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)




Constant -2.4366˚˚˚ -2.9231˚˚˚ -2.5561˚˚˚
(0.0068) (0.0093) (0.0106)
Fixed effects No No No
Observations 1,022,391 616,780 405,611
Adjusted R2 0.546 0.501 0.513
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of real hourly wage (lnwifjt). The sampling
period goes from 2006 to 2012. All specifications include year dummies and dummy variables for
education levels. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation with bootstrap standard errors (using
1000 draws) in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
1.8 Conclusions
A central feature of perfectly competitive markets is that markets clear, meaning
that all workers with similar quality should be paid the same market clearing wage.
Recent empirical evidence suggests the presence of considerable wage dispersion
among workers with similar characteristics and among similar firms. A potential
explanation for the presence of firm effects in wage regressions after accounting for
detailed firm, worker, and job title heterogeneity rely on the presence of considerable
frictions in the labor market, namely asymmetric information, worker immobility,
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and heterogenous preferences, which may constitute sources of market power for
employers.
In the new monopsony literature, search frictions imply that firms may face an
upward labor supply curve even if operating in a labor market with many competing
firms.
In this study we use matched employer-employee data and firm balance sheet
data to investigate the importance of firm total factor productivity and firm labor
market power in explaining firm heterogeneity in wage formation. We use a linear
regression model with one interacted high dimensional fixed effect to estimate 5-digit
sector-specific elasticity of output with respect to input factors directly from the
production function. This allows us to derive firm-specific price-cost mark-up and
firm-specific elasticity of labor supply. The results suggest that many Portuguese
firms are classified as monopsonist, and that there exists a broad range of firm
market power among monopsonist firms. The hypothesis that the elasticity of labor
supply is finite has major implications for theoretical models of labor economics.
We proceed by investigating the impact of the elasticity of labor supply to a
particular firm and firm total factor productivity on individuals’ earnings. Further-
more, we use the Gelbach’s exact decomposition to understand how firm’s monop-
sony power is associated with the firm’s wage setting policy. The results suggest
that a one standard deviation increase in the labor supply elasticity increases wages
by approximately 1.51 percent, ceteris paribus. This means that monopsony power
affects negatively the wages of workers. Also, we find evidence that the elasticity of
labor supply is mainly correlated with the firm effects as hypothesized in the labor
economics literature. This suggests that firm market power is a key ingredient to
explain heterogeneity in wage formation.
Last, we analyze if there are any gender differences on the impact of the labor
supply elasticity on earnings. The results reveal that the marginal impact of in-
creasing the labor supply elasticity to a particular firm is much lower for female
workers and that there are considerable differences in how market power on the
firms’ side affects workers’ wages. This finding is intimately related with the gender
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pay gap, and suggests that we should consider firms’ market power when analyzing
wage differentials arising from gender differences.
Appendix
Gelbach decomposition
In this section we closely follow Cardoso et al. (2016) to present the method-
ological details related to the Gelbach decomposition proposed by Gelbach (2016).
The linear wage equation estimated is given by:
lnwifjt “ Xiftβ ` φi ` γf ` ωj ` τt ` εifjt, (1.28)
where lnwifjt is the natural logarithm of the real hourly wage of individual i
(i=1,...,N) working at firm f (f=1,...,F) holding a job title j (j=1,...,J) at year t
(t=1,...,T). The vector Xift contains k observed time-varying characteristics of in-
dividual i (quadratic terms on age and yearly seniority within the firm). The terms
φi, γf , and ωj represent the individual, firm, and job-title fixed effects, respectively,
and measure observed and unobserved individual, firm, and job-title time-invariant
heterogeneity. The term τt is a set of year dummies.
Consider the basic regression of the natural logarithm of hourly wages on the set
of explanatory variables defined above and time dummies. This can be expressed in
matrix notation as:
Y “ Xb` ε. (1.29)
Then, following Gelbach (2016) and the omitted variable bias formula we can
write the difference between the coefficients of the basic specification defined in
equation (1.29) and those of the full specification presented in equation (1.28) as:
pb´ pβ “ PXDipφ`PXDfpγ `PXDjpω, (1.30)
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where PX “ pX
1Xq´1X1 and Dipφ, Dfpγ, and Djpω are column vectors containing the
estimates of the fixed effects for the worker, firm, and job title, respectively. This
means that PXDipφ is the coefficient of the regression of the worker fixed effects on
the set of variables X in the base model. A similar interpretation applies to the two
remaining terms in the right-hand side of equation (1.30). Then, we can rewrite the
previous equation more succinctly as:
pb´ pβ “ pδφ ` pδγ ` pδω. (1.31)
Then, the change in the coefficient of interest is partitioned into the role of the
different additional covariates, and the conditional contribution of the worker, firm,
and job title fixed effects to explain the firm labor market imperfection parameter
can be identified.
Chapter 2
Price setting and market
competition
2.1 Introduction
Macroeconomists have been studying for a long time the large effects of demand
shocks on output and, in particular, the non-neutrality of monetary policy on real
output. A growing empirical literature has emerged in the last decades documenting
the large effects of demand shocks on output (Blanchard & Perotti (2002), Ramey
(2009), and Nakamura & Steinsson (2014)) and the non-neutrality of monetary
shocks (Friedman & Schwartz (2008), Christiano et al. (1999), and Romer & Romer
(2004)). A central hypothesis for explaining these findings has been the sluggish
price adjustment to aggregate conditions. A large class of macroeconomic models
has been conceived in which firms, acting in a dynamic and stochastic environment,
face barriers to adjusting their prices in response to aggregate shocks. From our
standpoint, it is possible to summarize the theoretical literature along three lines of
research, according to how frictions to price-setting are formalized and, consequently,
to their predictions regarding inflation-output dynamics1.
1At the same time, some of the most critical contributions to our understanding of nominal
rigidity were introduced through static partial-equilibrium models. Two of the most notable ex-
amples are the seminal studies of Akerlof & Yellen (1985) and Ball & Romer (1990). The former
suggests that slightly non-optimizing behavior - “near rationality” - from price-setters could in-
duce sizable real effects from monetary disturbances, while the latter shows that explicit barriers
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Until recently, the literature was divided between models assuming that firms
would adjust their prices at an exogenously set timing and models that feature the
timing of price changes as endogenous to the firm. The first strand of literature,
known as time-dependent models, evolved from assuming that price changes follow
a deterministic pattern (Fischer (1977), Taylor (1980)) to postulating that oppor-
tunities for a firm to reset its price come randomly, as suggested by Calvo (1983).
Another strand of the literature, denoted as state-dependent models, formalizes the
idea that firms stand ready to change prices whenever it is worth doing so with the
introduction of a real cost to change a price, the menu cost. In these models, firms
with a large difference between the current and its desired price are the most likely
to change prices in response to a given shock (see, for example, Golosov & Lucas
(2007) and Dotsey et al. (1999)). Time-dependent models tend to yield larger and
more persistent real effects from monetary disturbances than state-dependent mod-
els because the set of firms that adjust prices are exogenously determined in the
former.
In the last decade, renewed attention to Lucas’ (1972) imperfect information
model spurred a new strand of literature building on the idea that monetary non-
neutrality arises from imperfect information about the state of the economy. The
model developed by Mankiw & Reis (2002) posits that firms, while being able to
set prices every period at no cost, adjust their planned price paths only when they
receive new information on the general price level, which happens at a Calvo-like
random frequency. The idea that there is too much information for agents to absorb
was later refined by the rational inattention model of Maćkowiak & Wiederholt
(2009), which specifies that agents have a fixed endowment of information-processing
capacity and gives a formal treatment to the agent’s problem of allocating its limited
attention to different sources of shocks.
Nakamura & Steinsson (2013) note that one important ingredient for sluggish
price adjustment in most models is coordination failure that leads to incomplete
to price adjustment are not enough for monetary disturbances to produce real effects, rather it is
also required that firms face strategic incentives to not fully and immediately adjust to any shock
(i.e., there must also exist real rigidity).
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price adjustment, even if prices change. Coordination failures among price setters
arise due to two essential factors. First, the timing of price changes is staggered,
either because it is exogenous - time-dependent models - or because the timing of
price changes is largely determined by idiosyncratic shocks that are orthogonal across
firms - modern state-dependent models; second, due to the presence of strategic com-
plementarity in price setting, which may result from intermediate inputs, demand
structures in which the elasticity of demand is an increasing function of a firm’s
relative price (Kimball (1995)), or heterogeneous factor markets (Gertler & Leahy
(2008)). Firms respond incompletely to an aggregate shock because other firms
have not yet responded. The combination of sticky prices and coordination failure
can generate large and long-lasting effects of demand shocks on output due to long-
lasting sluggishness of the aggregate price level. Business cycle models combining
these features are often referred to as New Keynesian models.
In the macroeconometric literature, some of the first notable studies attempted
to test the New Keynesian Phillips Curve through structural estimation of DSGE
models, generally finding that this relationship accounts for inflation dynamics in
a satisfactory way (Gaĺı & Gertler (1999), Gaĺı et al. (2001), Smets & Wouters
(2003), and Christiano et al. (2005)). More recent studies based on dynamic factor
models have focused on the response of sectoral price indices to both macroeconomic
and sectoral shocks, and conclude that they respond sluggishly to the former but
relatively quickly to the latter (Boivin et al. (2009), Maćkowiak et al. (2009), Kauf-
mann & Lein (2013)), which is evidence in favor of the rational inattention model
of Maćkowiak & Wiederholt (2009) or multi-setor menu cost models as developed
by Nakamura & Steinsson (2010).
Alternatively to assessing the macroeconomic implications of the different sticky
price models, and given the importance of the assumptions made about price ad-
justment, some authors have followed the seminal work of Bils & Klenow (2004) and
studied the dynamics of prices at micro level. The increasing availability of detailed
data such as that underlying the national Consumer Price Indices (CPI) or scanned
data from retailers promoted this area of research2. Klenow & Kryvtsov (2008) and
2See, among other studies, Dhyne et al. (2006) and Vermeulen et al. (2007) for the euro area;
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Nakamura & Steinsson (2008) use CPI data from the United States (U.S.) and ex-
tensively analyze the behavior of individual prices over time, namely the frequency
and size of price changes, both concluding that the data favor state- over time-
dependent models (mostly because the latter are inconsistent with a frequency of
price change that comoves with inflation and the fact that the size of a price change
is independent of price duration). Further evidence in favor of menu-cost models
was provided by Eichenbaum et al. (2011) using scanner data from a large U.S.
retailer. The authors observe that prices seem to be adjusted so that the mark-up
is not distant from a given reference value3.
In this study we rely on a rich micro dataset of producer prices collected at
a very granular level and analyze price setting behavior of manufacturing firms in
Portugal4. The first part of this study characterizes the duration of price spells
and the probability of a price change. We proceed by first estimating unconditional
survival functions for price adjustments by inflation regime. Then, we estimate a
duration model that extensively accounts for unobserved heterogeneity to exam-
ine the importance of idiosyncratic and sectoral characteristics in explaining the
probability of a price change. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
estimate a duration model for price adjustment with high dimensional fixed effects,
which allows us to extensively account for time-invariant (observed and unobserved)
product- and firm-specific heterogeneity. In both cases we distinguish between pos-
itive and negative price changes. In fact, the shape of the hazard function of price
changes conveys important information regarding the pricing rules of firms. If the
conditional probability of a price change depends positively on the elapsed duration,
the hazard function is upward sloping. If, conversely, the conditional probability of
and Dias et al. (2007) for Portugal.
3Klenow & Malin (2010) present a review of the micro price studies and summarize ten stylized
facts: prices change at least once a year, with temporary price discounts and product turnover often
playing an important role; reference prices are stickier and more persistent than regular prices; the
frequency of price changes differs widely across goods, with more cyclical goods exhibiting greater
price flexibility; the timing of price changes is little synchronized across sellers; the hazard (and
size) of price changes does not increase with the age of the price; the cross-sectional distribution of
price changes is thick-tailed, but many small price changes also occur; and finally, strong linkages
exist between price changes and wage changes.
4One important feature of producer price data is the high correlation between the frequency of
price change for manufacturing firms and consumer prices (Nakamura & Steinsson (2008)).
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a price change decreases with the elapsed duration, the hazard function is down-
ward sloping. This means that the Calvo model predicts that the hazard function
of price change is flat because the probability of price adjustment is constant and
does not depend on idiosyncratic shocks, and that the Taylor model predicts a zero
hazard except at a single age, when the hazard equals one. In contrast, menu cost
models can give rise to a wide variety of hazard functions, depending on the rel-
ative importance of inflation and idiosyncratic shocks. In fact, permanent shocks
tend to produce upward-slopping hazards while transitory shocks tend to flatten or
even produce downward-slopping hazards (see Nakamura & Steinsson (2008) for a
discussion).
In the second part we analyze how the degree of market competition influences
price setting behavior of manufacturing firms. In particular, we identify firms’ com-
petitors in the product market as those producing the same product in a given time
period, considering a very detailed definition of products. To this aim we consider
a peer-effects model to study the importance of competitors’ price setting behavior
in explaining a firm’s price change.
The results suggest that competitive pressure increases the likelihood of a price
increase and decreases the likelihood of a price decrease. Moreover, the probability of
a price increase or price decrease is estimated to comove with inflation, at both prod-
uct and sectoral level. A striking result is that when we account for time-invariant
(observed and unobserved) heterogeneity, duration dependence is estimated to be
positive in the case of both a price increase and a price decrease, which suggests
that prices that remained longer unchanged are more likely to change in the next
short period. Also, when we account for product and firm heterogeneity, prices are
estimated to be more likely to increase and less likely to decrease if prices decreased
the last time they changed. Overall, these results suggest that price setting depends
on both idiosyncratic and sectoral shocks, and that price adjustment is considerably
heterogeneous across products and firms.
Furthermore, we estimate that firms’ price setting behavior responds to the price
setting behavior of their competitors, even though the small magnitude of the esti-
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mated peer effect suggests that firms respond incompletely and sluggishly to their
competitors’ price setting decisions. This result aligns with the presence of coordi-
nation failures in price adjustment among price setters.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 3.5 presents the data and describes the
main facts of price duration in Portugal. Section 2.3 presents the survival function
for price adjustment. Section 2.4 presents the empirical models considered in the
estimation of the hazard function of price adjustment and discusses the results.
Section 2.5 presents the empirical methodology to estimate how market competition
affects firms’ price setting behavior and discusses the results. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The data
In this study we use the Industrial Production Prices Index dataset (IPPI) col-
lected by the Portuguese Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estat́ıstica -
INE ). These data are a monthly compilation of transaction prices obtained from
companies whose principal or secondary activity is mining and quarrying, manufac-
turing, and electricity, gas and water supply. The sample covers a large fraction of
the Portuguese manufacturing industry, representing approximately 90 percent of
the production value of manufacturing firms5. The data are available for the period
between January 1995 and September 2002. We restrict our analysis to manufac-
turing firms and to the period ending in December 2001 to avoid the escudo-euro
contamination.
The unit of observation is a specific product defined at a very granular level and
collected at the three-digit NACE level, produced in a given establishment. Items
are classified using the Prodcom nomenclature at the 12-digit level. The sample
is comprised of about 722 classes of products. The 14,590 items in the sample
correspond to 2,279 different firms. The surveyed firms are asked on average about
the price of five products. The sample is not balanced because of entries and exits
of firms in the sampled population and due to the product sampling method. The
5Firms that provide only manufacturing services are excluded from the sample.
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average number of units interviewed is 1,966 and approximately 10,379 prices are
collected monthly.
The data are obtained through a monthly survey sent to firms located in Portugal
and conducted in the first week of each month. Firms are asked about the transaction
prices6 of a predetermined set of products with day 15 of each month as the reference
date. This allows us to construct a dataset with multiple completed price spells for
the same product.
The dataset is organized at the firm-product-month level. For each firm-product
combination in the sample we can observe multiple spells, with each spell corre-
sponding to a price change. This raises an important issue because there are some
observations corresponding to spells for which the first observation does not fol-
low a price change, meaning that these observations are left-censored7. Because we
are estimating the probability of price changes since the last price change, we fol-
low the standard practice in the duration literature of dropping these observations.
We ended with a sample comprising approximately 2,278 firms and 6,228 monthly
collected prices.
The frequency of price changes is depicted in Figure 2.1. The distribution is
skewed to the right, with the number of price spells concentrated at small values.
The median price spell is equal to 5 and very few products register more than nine
price spells over the sampling period. The average price spell is equal to 5.4. This
distribution of price adjustments may be prima facie evidence of some nominal price
rigidity in price changes.
In our sample, approximately 30 percent of price changes are price decreases
and 70 percent are price increases8. This pattern of price changes is consistent with
the hypothesis that idiosyncratic factors play an important role in explaining price
dynamics since inflation in Portugal remained steadily positive over the sampling
6Prices are not deducted of any discounts or subsidies and taxes are not added.
7If not properly accounted for, this may introduce an initial-conditions problem leading the
estimation of duration to be downward biased (Heckman & Singer (1986)). This means that, as in
the case of the stock sampling problem well-known in the duration literature (Lancaster (1979)),
longer spells are more likely to be left-censored.
8Nakamura & Steinsson (2008) report that price declines are very common, accounting for about












0 5 10 15 20 25
Price spells
Figure 2.1: Distribution of the frequency of monthly price changes.
2.3 The survival function of price adjustment
Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 present the survival functions for price spells by inflation
regime, distinguishing between positive and negative price changes. We consider
three inflation regimes calculated as the average price change at the product level:
negative inflation, moderate inflation, and high inflation. The threshold for high
inflation is equal to 0.001, which roughly corresponds to the median inflation at the
product level.
Figure 2.2 depicts the survival function for price variation (without distinguishing
between price increases and price decreases) according to the inflation regime. At
first glance, price behavior is considerably heterogeneous by inflation regime. Prices
of products in the negative inflation regime exhibit considerably lower survival rates
in the initial periods than the prices of products in the moderate and high inflation
regimes. This means that prices of products are more likely to change in the case of
negative inflation. The survival functions of price adjustment in the moderate and
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Figure 2.2: Kaplan-Meier survival function by inflation regime.
Notes: Inflation regimes are defined at the product level. For detailed data definitions see Section
3.5.
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show the survival rates for positive and negative price changes
by inflation regime, respectively. These figures reveal that the patterns of price
changes are clearly different when we split price changes into price increases and
price decreases. The survival function for positive price changes indicates that the
likelihood of a price increase is considerably higher in periods of negative inflation
up to twelve months. From this moment on, the survival rates are lower for prices
in the high inflation regime, suggesting that the likelihood of price adjustment is
higher for prices in this regime.
In turn, Figure 2.4 shows the survival function for negative price changes and
suggests that the likelihood of a price decrease is considerably lower in the negative
inflation regime. Furthermore, prices in the high and moderate inflation regimes
exhibit high survival rates, which suggests that the probability of a price decrease
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Figure 2.3: Kaplan-Meier survival function for positive price changes by inflation
regime.
Notes: Survival functions calculated for products that registered a price increase the last time
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Figure 2.4: Kaplan-Meier survival function for negative price changes by inflation
regime.
Notes: Survival functions calculated for products that registered a price decrease the last time
they changed. Inflation regimes are defined at the product level. For detailed data definitions see
Section 3.5.
Moreover, even though prices do not seem to adjust continuously, we observe
a spike at twelve months in the three figures, which suggests that prices adjust at
least once a year. Empirical evidence for the U.S. producer prices documents that
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the estimated hazard function is downward sloping for the first few months, then
mostly flat except for a spike in the hazard at twelve months (Nakamura & Steinsson
(2008)).
2.4 Empirical methodology
A key concept in duration analysis is the hazard function, which represents the
instantaneous probability of a price change at time t, t “ 1, 2, ..., k, conditional on
survival to time t. The shape of the hazard function is meaningful to characterize
price adjustment because it is upward sloping if prices that remain unchanged longer
are the most likely to change, downward sloping if prices that changed recently are
more likely to change again, and flat if the probability of price adjustment is constant
over time.
Let time be divided into k intervals of time rT0, T1q, rT1, T2q ... rTk´1,8q
9. We
observe discrete time T P 1, ..., k and T “ t denotes a transition within the interval
rTt´1, Ttq. Hence, the hazard function can be defined as:
hptq “ PrpT “ t|T ě tq, t “ 1, 2, ..., k ´ 1, (2.1)
and the survival function, which gives the probability of surviving in the same state
up to time t is given by:





We estimate the hazard function for producer prices considering a discrete time
proportional hazards model. The extension of the proportional hazards model to





9The empirical formulation closely follows Addison & Portugal (2008).
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where S0ptq is the baseline survival function, the vector xi is a set of k observed co-
variates of firm i, and β is a vector of coefficients. Given the relationship between the
hazard and the survival functions for discrete time, the conditional hazard function
for the complementary log-log model can be written as:




which can be factored into a non-parametric baseline hazard function h0ptq that is a
function of t alone, and a function exppx
1
iβq that depends on x alone. We estimate
the model by maximum likelihood.
The vector of explanatory variables xi is comprised of a measure of competitive
pressure calculated as the (logarithm of the) number of firms producing the same
product in the same time period (log number of competitors), the (logarithm of
the) magnitude of the last price change (log magnitude last price change), and an
indicator variable for the case in which the last price change was a price decrease
(Last change price decrease). We also calculate two measures of inflation defined as
the logarithm of the average price change at the product level (Product inflationt´1)
and at the sectoral level (Inflationt´1). These two variables are introduced in the
model estimation lagged by one period10. Duration dependence is accounted for in
the logarithm of price duration (log duration).
Empirical evidence suggests that there is considerable seasonal synchronization
on price changes, meaning that a fraction of firms is likely to adjust their prices at
regular intervals11. This evidence in favor of price rigidity as arising from seasonal
10Klenow & Malin (2010) document that the main determinants of the frequency of price change
mentioned in the literature are the level and volatility of inflation, the frequency and magnitude of
cost and demand shocks, the structure and degree of market competition, and the price collecting
methods of statistical agencies (namely on whether temporary sales and product turnover are
reported). Fabiani et al. (2005) report that the main four reasons why Eurozone firms refrain
from changing prices are implicit and explicit contracts with customers, cost-based pricing (i.e.
staggered input prices), and coordination failure.
11Nakamura & Steinsson (2008) document that producer prices in the U.S. are substantially more
likely to change in the first quarter of the year and Alvarez et al. (2006) find the same pattern of
price change for consumer prices in the euro area. Dias et al. (2007) use consumer prices to study
the duration of price spells and find that seasonal dummies are statistically significant, suggesting
that some price changes follow a regular schedule. Dias et al. (2004) suggest that this pattern of
price change can be interpreted as an indication of time-dependency on price setting but also as a
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behavior in price setting has important implications for monetary policy, because
shocks in the first part of the year may yield greater effects than shocks later on.
To account for seasonality we include a set of monthly dummy variables in the
estimation. Moreover, we include a linear time trend in the analysis (Time).
2.4.1 Results
In this section we analyze the importance of idiosyncratic and sectoral charac-
teristics in explaining the probability of a price change. The analysis of the deter-
minants of price duration without accounting for product or firm unobserved het-
erogeneity is presented in Table 2.1. The estimates are reported for overall prices12,
price increases, and price decreases. The results suggest that market competition
as measured by the (logarithm of the) number of competitors negatively affects the
likelihood of a price change in the case of overall prices and price decreases, and
contributes positively to the likelihood of a price change in the case of a price in-
crease. This result implies that competitive pressure increases the likelihood of a
price increase and decreases the likelihood of a price decrease. The likelihood of a
price increase or price decrease is higher for prices that decreased the last time they
changed, but the coefficient is much higher in the case of a price decrease. Further-
more, even though of small magnitude, the (logarithm of the) last price change is
negatively correlated with the likelihood of a price change in all cases and, there-
fore, the higher the magnitude of the last price change the lower the probability of
changing prices, once again.
In this model aggregate inflation and inflation calculated at the product level
are not statistically significant when we analyze overall price variation. However,
according to the results reported in column (2), price increases are predicted to
comove with inflation, at either the sectoral or product level. Moreover, the re-
sults reported in column (3) suggest that price decreases also comove with inflation,
meaning that prices are more likely to decrease when inflation decreases. This result
result of the high concentration of changes in production costs in the beginning of the year.
12We use the term “overall prices” to denote price variation without distinguishing between price
increases and price decreases.
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is especially strong in the case of sectoral inflation. These results partly contrast
with the findings in Nakamura & Steinsson (2008) for the U.S., which suggest that
the frequency of price increases covaries with inflation while the frequency of price
decreases is largely unresponsive to inflation. Nevertheless, the results are consistent
with a menu cost model influenced by idiosyncratic shocks in both studies.
Table 2.1: Determinants of price duration
Price variation Price Increase Price Decrease
(1) (2) (3)
log number of competitors -0.0228˚˚˚ 0.0165˚˚˚ -0.0917˚˚˚
(0.0048) (0.0057) (0.0087)
Last change price decrease 0.3393˚˚˚ 0.0980˚˚˚ 0.7524˚˚˚
(0.0124) (0.0157) (0.0212)
log magnitude last price change -0.0040˚˚˚ -0.0027˚˚˚ -0.0126˚˚˚
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0015)






log duration -0.3481˚˚˚ -0.2266˚˚˚ -0.5818˚˚˚
(0.0053) (0.0064) (0.0099)
Time -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0019˚˚˚
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005)
constant -0.9088˚˚˚ -1.5180˚˚˚ -1.9459˚˚˚
(0.0247) (0.0296) (0.0462)
Observations 495,789 495,789 495,789
Notes: The sampling period goes from March 1995 to December 2001. Complementary log-log
estimates and standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include monthly dummies. ***,
**, and * stand for statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
The estimated coefficient for duration dependence is negative, suggesting a down-
ward hazard function of price adjustment, which implies that the probability of a
price change is negatively associated with price duration, or in other words, that
prices that have remained unchanged for longer periods are the ones that are less
likely to make a transition. The general finding in the empirical literature of price
adjustment is that hazard rates are mostly flat, except for a spike at twelve months.
Nevertheless, the fact that we do not account for product- or firm-specific effects
in the estimation results reported in Table 2.1 may bias the estimated pattern of
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duration dependence.
2.4.2 Models with frailty
A major empirical issue in the estimation of hazard rates of price changes is how
to account for cross-product heterogeneity in the level of the hazard function. If not
properly accounted for, cross-product heterogeneity can lead to downward-sloping
hazard functions, even if the true hazard function for any individual product is
upward sloping or flat (see, for example, Lancaster (1979) and Heckman & Singer
(1986)). Klenow & Malin (2010) show that the frequency of price adjustment de-
pends on the firms’ technology with firms that are more labor-intensive tending to
change prices less frequently (in comparison to firms with higher shares of energy
and non-energy intermediate inputs)13.
To deal with this issue we follow two estimation strategies. First, we estimate
the model proposed by Lancaster (1979), which allows for multiplicative unobserved
heterogeneity in the level of the hazard function. Under the proportional hazards
model and assuming the exponential mean with a multiplicative error as functional
form, the complementary log-log (cloglog) model specification can be written as
follows:
cloglog rppt,xi|β, νiqs “ Dptq ` x
1
iβ ` ui (2.5)
where νi denotes an unobserved heterogeneity term for product i, ui is the logarithm
of νi distributed with zero mean, andDptq characterizes the baseline hazard function.
Then, prices of products with above-average values of ν change relatively quickly,
meaning that, other things remaining equal, the corresponding hazard rate is higher
and, consequently, their survival times are shorter. The opposite holds true for
prices of products with below-average values of ν. We estimate a random intercepts
13Dias et al. (2004) use Portuguese data on consumer and producer prices and document that
the frequency of price adjustment differs significantly across sectors but also across firms and stores.
In particular, the frequency of price adjustment in the food sector is considerably higher than in
the services sector.
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model assuming that the unobserved heterogeneity term is normally distributed.
The estimation of this model requires expressions for survival and density func-
tions that do not condition on the unobserved effects. This is because the random
term ν for each individual is unobserved. One solution is to integrate out the unob-
served effect (see Jenkins (2005)), by specifying a distribution for the random effect
ν characterized in terms of parameters. Then, the survival function is written in
terms of the latter.
A second way to deal with product and firm unobserved heterogeneity is to
estimate a discrete time proportional hazards model with high dimensional fixed
effects. We consider product and firm high dimensional fixed effects in the estimation
of the probability of a price change in order to extensively account for (observed and
unobserved) time-invariant heterogeneity at the product and firm level. The fact
that we have multiple spells with completed durations for each product in the dataset
allows us to account for product-level frailties in addition to firm-level frailties. The
estimation procedure uses a re-iterated weighted least squares algorithm.
Results
The estimation results of the random intercepts model are presented in Table 2.2.
The estimated coefficient for duration dependence is now estimated to be positive
in columns (1) and (2). This means that the hazard rate is estimated to be upward
sloping in the case of overall prices and price increases, which is consistent with prices
that remained unchanged for longer periods of time being more likely to change.
This result holds true in the model estimated with fixed effects and highlights the
importance of unobserved heterogeneity in the estimation of the probability of a
price change. In fact, an interesting result is that duration dependence is estimated
to be negative in the fixed effects model if we do not account for firm permanent
heterogeneity. Also, it is worth noting that the estimated coefficient for duration
dependence is increasing in the number of fixed effects considered in the estimation.
In the case of negative price changes, the estimated coefficient for duration de-
pendence in the random intercepts model and in the fixed effects model remains
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negative, which suggests that the distribution of negative price changes has a nega-
tive slope and, therefore, the longer the prices have remained unchanged the lower
the probability of a price decrease in the next short period. The estimated coeffi-
cient for duration dependence is much smaller in the case of the fixed effects model.
These results suggest that the frequency of price change is correlated with the age
of prices, which is evidence in favor of state-dependent models in which shocks accu-
mulate over time, and contrasts with the documented lack of relationship between
the frequency and timing of price changes (see Klenow & Malin (2010)).
Table 2.2: Determinants of price duration: random effects model
Price variation Price Increase Price Decrease
(1) (2) (3)
log number of competitors -0.0218˚˚ 0.0271˚˚˚ -0.1587˚˚˚
(0.0110) (0.0099) (0.0164)
Last change price decrease 0.1234˚˚˚ 0.2204˚˚˚ 0.1112˚˚˚
(0.0156) (0.0190) (0.0256)








log duration 0.1126˚˚˚ 0.1041˚˚˚ -0.2283˚˚˚
(0.0077) (0.0093) (0.0128)
Time -0.0053˚˚˚ -0.0035˚˚˚ -0.0051˚˚˚
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005)
constant -1.8608˚˚˚ -2.3339˚˚˚ -2.7798˚˚˚
(0.0451) (0.0451) (0.0701)
Observations 495,789 495,789 495,789
Notes: The sampling period goes from March 1995 to December 2001. Complementary log-log with
random effects estimates and standard errors in parentheses. The likelihood ratio test suggests that
frailty is statistically significant in the three models. All specifications include monthly dummies.
***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
According to the results reported in Table 2.3, the likelihood of price increases
and price decreases comove with inflation at the product and sectoral level. Sectoral
inflation is not statistically significant in the case of price variation without distin-
guishing between price increases and price decreases. Furthermore, the likelihood of
a price decrease is now estimated to depend negatively on prices having decreased
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the last time they changed, which seems to be a more intuitive result than otherwise.
Table 2.3: Determinants of price duration: two high dimensional fixed effects model
Price variation Price Increase Price Decrease
(1) (2) (3)
log number of competitors 0.3614˚˚˚ 0.5862˚˚˚ -0.1572˚
(0.0560) (0.0684) (0.0921)
Last change price decrease 0.0460˚˚˚ 0.1484˚˚˚ -0.1094˚˚˚
(0.0166) (0.0215) (0.0243)








log duration 0.1764˚˚˚ 0.2906˚˚˚ -0.0590˚˚˚
(0.0074) (0.0090) (0.0128)
Time -0.0052˚˚˚ -0.0051˚˚˚ -0.0051˚˚˚
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Observations 469,365 457,334 353,481
Product fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The sampling period goes from March 1995 to December 2001. Complementary log-log
estimation with two high dimensional fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. All specifica-
tions include monthly dummies. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and
10%, respectively.
A notable result is the greater magnitude of the estimated coefficient for product
competition in the high dimensional fixed effects model for price increases when
compared to the random intercepts model. Moreover, the (logarithm of the) number
of a firm’s competitors is now estimated to positively affect the likelihood of a price
change in the case of overall price variation. These results seem to be partly driven
by product permanent heterogeneity since they are estimated to be considerably
smaller when we do not consider the product fixed effect in the estimation.
Table 2.4 presents fixed effects estimates for the determinants of price duration
considering the interaction between firm and product fixed effects. In the previous
case, product fixed effects were introduced in the model estimation to account for
product-specific heterogeneity while firm fixed effects captured the price strategy
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of the firm. In this case, the interaction term between product and firm fixed
effects accounts for the heterogeneity in the price policy of the firm for each product
produced by the firm. The results are mostly robust to this model specification.
Nevertheless, the estimates suggest that duration dependence in the case of a price
decrease is estimated to be positive, meaning that the likelihood of a price decrease
increases with the elapsed price duration.
Table 2.4: Determinants of price duration: high dimensional fixed effects model
Price variation Price Increase Price Decrease
(1) (2) (3)
log number of competitors 0.4529˚˚˚ 0.6684˚˚˚ -0.1636
(0.0620) (0.0759) (0.1038)
Last change price decrease 0.0030 0.2945˚˚˚ -0.3484˚˚˚
(0.0195) (0.0264) (0.0268)








log duration 0.3911˚˚˚ 0.5094˚˚˚ 0.1217˚˚˚
(0.0091) (0.0112) (0.0153)
Time -0.0083˚˚˚ -0.0077˚˚˚ -0.0078˚˚˚
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006)
Observations 425,751 399,650 208,793
ProductˆFirm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The sampling period goes from March 1995 to December 2001. Complementary log-log
estimation with high dimensional fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. All specifications
include monthly dummies. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
Overall, these results suggest that price setting of manufacturing firms depends
on idiosyncratic and sectoral shocks, and that price adjustment is considerably het-
erogeneous across products and firms. Furthermore, our results show that when
product- and firm-specific heterogeneity is properly accounted for in the estimation,
the hazard rate of price adjustment is predicted to be upward-sloping in the case of
both positive and negative price changes.
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2.5 Peer effects
In this section we analyze the presence of coordination failures in price setting. In
particular, we estimate how a firm price setting behavior responds to its competitors’
price setting decisions. In fact, the estimation results reported in Tables 2.3 and 2.4
suggest that competitive pressure at the product level is an important determinant of
the duration of price spells for Portuguese manufacturing firms, but little or nothing
is known on how these firms react to their competitors’ price setting behavior.
We consider a peer-effects model that allows us to estimate how firm prices adjust
to competitors’ price changes.
2.5.1 Empirical methodology
The estimation of peer effects building on individual behavior as a function of
group averages can be challenging. Angrist (2014) documents the main sources of
estimation bias in models of peer effects and notes the importance of controlling
ourselves in y on y-bar regressions14. In this study we follow Arcidiacono et al.
(2012) and assume that the importance of own characteristics is proportional to
that of competitors’ characteristics. Then, the model specification to estimate the
peer effect of competitors’ price setting behavior is given by:
yift “ ρyift´1 ` xftβ ` αif ` δᾱift ` µt ` εift (2.6)
where yift is the logarithm of the price of product i produced by firm f at month
t and yift´1 is an autoregressive term; xft comprises the (logarithm of the) price
of each firm competitors at each time period (log competitors prices), two indices
of price variation calculated at the product and sectoral level lagged by one period
(Index product pricest´1 and Index pricest´1, respectively), and the (logarithm of
the) number of the firm’s competitors; αif is a time-invariant firm-product fixed
14Other sources of estimation bias in peer effects models are selection bias, measurement error,
nonlinear effects, and the common shocks problem.
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effect; ᾱift is the mean of the fixed effects of the competitors of firm f at time t;
µt is a vector of time dummies; and εift is a zero mean disturbance term capturing
all other omitted factors. The competitors of firm f are defined as all firms that, in
a given month, produce the same product as firm f and, therefore, exhibits some
time-variability. The parameter δ is the one of main interest and measures the peer
effect.
The term ᾱift measures the average price of a firm’s competitors and is identified
even in the presence of the product-firm fixed effect (αif ) because the composition
of a firm’s competitors changes over time.
The model specification formulated in (2.6) can be estimated by ordinary least
squares even though its solution is nonlinear. This happens because the fixed effect
for a given firm-product combination enters directly in some observations and in-
directly in other observations via prices of competitors. Arcidiacono et al. (2012)
identify the set of assumptions under which the least squares solution provides con-
sistent estimates for the parameters of the model presented in equation (2.6). Then,
the model can be estimated using the algorithm proposed by Portugal & Guimarães
(2010) to estimate models with high dimensional fixed effects.
2.5.2 Results
The estimation results of the peer-effects model are reported in Table 2.5. These
results suggest that a firm’s prices depend positively on its competitors’ prices,
meaning that firms increase prices when the average price of their competitors also
increase. According to the estimates, firm’s prices are predicted to increase by about
0.0318 percent when competitors’ prices increase by 1 percent, ceteris paribus15. The
small magnitude of the estimated peer effect seems to be consistent with the incom-
plete price adjustment that arises from coordination failures across firms, although
it is partly explained by the fact that the set of competitors is quite constant over
time.
15Despite the high magnitude of the autoregressive term, the Im-Pesaran-Shin unit root test
leads to the rejection of the hypothesis of panel non-stationarity.
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Furthermore, the estimation results suggest that prices are predicted to respond
positively to product and sectoral inflation. The long-run effects of these two vari-
ables are non-negligible even though the magnitude of the short-run effects seems
to be small.
It is important to note that even though the estimation is performed considering
the dependent and explanatory variables in levels, the fact that we are considering
the interaction term between firm and product fixed effects in the estimation leads
to a similar interpretation of a first-differences model from a time series perspective.
All in all, the estimated peer effect in producer price setting is positive and sta-
tistically significant even though of small magnitude. This tallies with the presence
of coordination failures in price setting behavior across firms.






log competitors prices 0.0318˚˚˚
(0.0026)






log number of competitors 0.0004˚˚˚
(0.0000)
Observations 534,735
ProductˆFirm fixed effects Yes
Notes: The sampling period goes from January 1995 to December 2001. Interacted high di-
mensional fixed effects estimation with standard errors in parentheses. *** stands for statistical
significance at 1%.
2.6 Conclusions
A central hypothesis for the large effects of demand shocks and the non-neutrality
of monetary policy on real output is the sluggish price adjustment to aggregate
conditions.
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The theoretical literature on price rigidity can be broadly summarized in three
lines of research: time-dependent models, state-dependent models, and imperfect
information models. Time-dependent models assume that firms adjust their prices
at an exogenously set timing while state-dependent models presume that firms decide
to change prices according to the state of the economy at each moment. Last, Lucas’
(1972) imperfect information model builds on the idea of monetary non-neutrality as
arising from imperfect information about the state of the economy. A key ingredient
for sluggish price adjustment in most models is coordination failure, which leads
firms to adjust incompletely to aggregate shocks because other firms have not yet
responded.
Our study contributes to the existing empirical literature on the micro-foundations
of aggregate price setting in two different ways. First, to the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to estimate a duration model to estimate price transitions with high
dimensional fixed effects, which allows us to control for (observed and unobserved)
time-invariant heterogeneity at the product and firm level; and second, we provide
direct evidence on the impact of market competition on firms’ price setting rules by
estimating peer effects in a price setting model.
We conduct the analysis in two steps: first, we estimate a duration model for
price adjustment in which we extensively account for permanent product- and firm-
specific heterogeneity; then we estimate a peer effects model to document how firms
react to the price setting behavior of their competitors.
The results suggest that competitive pressure increases the likelihood of a price
increase and decreases the likelihood of a price decrease. Moreover, the probabil-
ity of a price increase or price decrease is estimated to comove with inflation, at
both product and sectoral level. A notable result is that when we fully account for
time-invariant (observed and unobserved) heterogeneity, duration dependence is es-
timated to be positive in the case of both a price increase and price decrease, which
suggests that prices that have remained unchanged longer are more likely to change
in the next short period. Also, when we account for product and firm heterogeneity,
prices are estimated to be more likely to increase and less likely to decrease if prices
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decreased the last time they changed. Overall, these results suggest that price set-
ting depends on both idiosyncratic and sectoral shocks, and that price adjustment
is considerably heterogeneous across products and firms.
Furthermore, we estimate that firms’ price setting behavior responds to the price
setting behavior of their competitors, even though the small magnitude of the esti-
mated peer effect suggests that firms respond incompletely and sluggishly to their
competitors’ price setting decisions. This result aligns with the presence of coordi-
nation failures in price adjustment among price setters.
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Chapter 3
Credit Rationing for Portuguese
SMEs
3.1 Introduction
In the years that preceded the recent crisis, the Portuguese non-financial cor-
porations accumulated high levels of debt, with the ratio between the non-financial
corporate sector debt and GDP registering values higher than 130 percent1 in 2008.
This evolution of credit was induced by favorable financing conditions and optimistic
expectations of productivity growth that did not materialize, highlighting the need
for an adjustment process. The global financial crisis and the subsequent sovereign
debt crisis led to an adjustment process characterized by a significant contraction of
the economic activity and worse prospects of economic agents. Furthermore, this ad-
justment involved a bank lending channel with the Portuguese banks being severely
affected by international financing restrictions and stronger capital requirements. In
this context, the adjustment process comprised a simultaneous contraction in the
demand and supply of credit. According to the Bank Lending Survey (BLS), the
observed credit evolution during the economic and financial crisis was a result of
increased restrictiveness in credit standards and conditions applied on loans as well
1This value refers to the ratio between the non-financial corporate sector debt and GDP in
consolidated terms, calculated according to ESA 1995.
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as of decreased loan demand by firms. Nevertheless, it is a difficult task to rigorously
evaluate the relative contribution of each dimension2.
The availability of microeconomic datasets with a maximum level of granularity
has been crucial for the development of new approaches to the identification of credit
rationing of non-financial corporations. Antunes & Martinho (2012) estimated a
model to explain the evolution of credit granted by Portuguese banks to non-financial
corporations and to examine the eventual presence of credit restrictions, using data
for the period between the first quarter of 1995 and the first quarter of 2012. Even
though this analysis does not allow to unequivocally identify the relative contribution
of credit demand and credit supply to explain the evolution of credit, the results
suggest that the access to credit by Portuguese firms became more difficult after
2009 and that credit restrictions were particularly relevant for firms seeking credit
for the first time. Farinha & Félix (2014) considered an econometric methodology
similar to that in Rottmann & Wollmershäuser (2013) and estimated a two-step
model to evaluate the importance of credit demand and credit supply factors in
explaining the evolution of credit in the period between the first quarter of 1997
and the second quarter of 2013. The results suggest that after controlling for firm
idiosyncratic characteristics, the evolution of credit is largely explained by banks
liquidity and solvency conditions. The fact that banks react in a significant way to
changes in their liquidity structure and to stricter minimum capital requirements,
with banks having less access to funding and smaller capital buffers granting less
credit to firms, suggests the presence of a bank lending channel through which banks
can affect firms financing conditions (assuming that at least a fraction of firms does
not have easy access to alternative sources of financing)3. Nevertheless, this analysis
is only indicative of the presence of credit restrictions in the Portuguese economy.
The disequilibrium models, originally developed to evaluate the presence of credit
rationing at the macroeconomic level (see, for example, Laffont & Garcia (1977)),
2An analysis of this topic using the BLS data can be found in the Box 1.2.1 “Decomposing credit
growth on the basis of the Bank Lending Survey”, published in the Financial Stability Report
of Banco de Portugal, November 2013. The authors construct indices based on the qualitative
answers of bank officials regarding the developments in the credit market and include these indices
as explanatory variables in a model to explain credit growth.
3This result contributes to the discussion on the bank lending channel and bank capital channel.
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have been used more recently in the empirical literature to identify credit restrictions
based on microeconomic data. These models assume that the credit market may be
in disequilibrium and therefore, the observed interest rate does not ensure that credit
demand is equal to credit supply. Ogawa & Suzuki (2000), Atanasova & Wilson
(2004), Shikimi (2005) and Carbo-Valverde et al. (2009) estimated disequilibrium
models to identify the presence of credit rationing in the economy. More recently,
Kremp & Sevestre (2013) considered this methodology to analyse the determinants
of credit demand and credit supply for French small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) and found that, even though banks adopted tighter standards in credit
approval, French firms were not significantly affected by credit rationing, even after
2008.
In this study we assess the importance of credit demand and credit supply-
related factors in explaining the evolution of credit granted to Portuguese SMEs
and evaluate whether this evolution stems from a more restrictive credit policy in
the period between 2010 and 2012. We restrict our sample to SMEs since they are
expected to rely more on bank loans and to have less access to external sources of
financing, namely financing by non-resident banks. Therefore, it is expected that
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are potentially the most affected by
credit restrictions. For that purpose, we consider a methodology that allows to
simultaneously estimate credit supply and credit demand functions, assuming that
the credit market may be in disequilibrium, as modeled in Kremp & Sevestre (2013).
The results suggest that credit supply depends positively on the amount of assets
available to be provided as collateral and negatively on firms’ indebtedness. In
turn, credit demand depends negatively on the interest rate and on the amount of
firms’ internal resources, and positively on their working capital needs. We estimate
that approximately 15 percent of Portuguese SMEs with bank loans were partially
rationed and 32 percent of firms with no bank loans were fully rationed.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we present the model
and the variables considered in the analysis, and in Section 3.3 we discuss some
econometric questions. In Section 3.4 we present the methodology to evaluate the
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intensive and extensive margins of credit rationing. The data and main descriptive
statistics are presented in Section 3.5. In Section 3.6 we discuss the main results
and Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 The demand and supply of credit: model and variables
3.2.1 The disequilibrium model
A disequilibrium model comprehends essentially three equations: one for credit
demand, one for credit supply, and one additional equation that links credit de-
mand to credit supply. We closely follow Kremp & Sevestre (2013) to present the
disequilibrium model in the case of the credit market:
• An equation for the demand of new loans, NL‹d: NL‹d “ fdpXdbd;udq;
• An equation for the supply of new loans, NL‹s: NL‹s “ fspXsbs;usq;
where Xd and Xs represent the vectors of explanatory variables that affect
credit demand and credit supply, respectively, and bd and bs are the vectors
of coefficients associated with those variables. The terms ud and us with zero
mean and variance σ2d and σ
2
s , respectively, represent the unobservable factors
that affect credit demand and credit supply, respectively, and it is assumed
that they may be correlated with each other (ρ);
• And an equation that links the observed quantity of credit with the unob-
servable credit demand and supply: NL “ minpNL‹d, NL
‹
sq. This equation
assumes that the observed quantity of credit is the minimum between credit
demand and credit supply.
This system of equations is estimated using the maximum likelihood estimator
(see Maddala & Nelson (1974)).
62
When the demand and supply of credit are strictly positive and the interest rate
is observed, the contribution to the maximum likelihood function is given by:













is the density function of new
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tion function.
3.2.2 Variables
In this section we present the variables included in the model. We consider that
the demand for new loans depends on the following economic factors:
Firm activity:
• Firm size - smaller firms are expected to have more difficulties in accessing
credit from sources other than bank loans and, simultaneously, are the most
affected by credit restrictions due to their financial structure and their higher
exposure to information asymmetries. This paper voluntarily restricts the
analysis to SMEs. We consider three size categories: very small firms, small
firms, and medium-sized firms4.
• Short-term financing needs - the ratio between the firm’s working capital needs
and total assets is included in the analysis as a measure of the firm’s short-term
financing needs.
4This classification follows the European classification of SMEs.
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• Long-term financing needs - the investment, calculated as the ratio between the
first differences of tangible assets and total assets, is considered as a measure
of long-term financing needs.
Availability of substitute funds on the demand for bank loans (internal or external
funds):
• Amount of internal resources - the pecking order hypothesis says that firms
with higher capacity to finance their activity through internal resources are
less likely to seek bank loans since the latter have a higher cost, in particular
for smaller firms that are expected to be more exposed to information asym-
metries; nevertheless, firms may decide to increase their debt if the advantages
associated with debt exceed the costs (namely, firms may benefit from fiscal
advantages); the considered measure for the amount of internal resources is
the ratio between the firm’s operational results (EBITDA)5 and total assets.
• Other sources of external financing - the non-financial debt that, in the case
of SMEs, is largely composed by loans granted by shareholders and accounts
payable, is an alternative source of financing less costly than bank loans; there-
fore, we include in the demand function the difference between firm’s total debt
and debt to credit institutions, and the accounts payable, measured in terms
of total assets.
Cost of bank credit:
• Interest rate - it is included in the demand function as a measure of the firm’s
financing costs and is calculated by dividing the interest expenses by the firm’s
total debt.
Time and sectoral dummy variables - time dummies are included in the demand
equation to account for macroeconomic shocks that affect firms’ credit demand and
5The operational result is considered as a proxy variable for the amount of internal resources.
In fact, this variable can be interpreted as a measure of the potential amount of internal resources
that the firm may decide to retain or distribute as dividends.
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sectoral dummies are considered to capture sector systematic differences in credit
demand.
In turn, the following determinants are considered in the equation of credit sup-
ply:
Firm-specific risk:
• Firm size - this variable reflects the credit risk associated with a given firm
since firms’ survival probability is lower for small firms and the risk to go
bankrupt is higher for these firms when compared to larger firms.
• Age of the firm - the default risk is higher for younger firms (see, for example,
Fougère et al. (2012)). The analysis includes an indicator variable equal to
one for firms less than or five years old, and zero for older firms.
• Ratio between financial debt and operational results - measures the capacity
of the firm to generate cash-flows to pay its debt and is also a measure of credit
risk: it is evaluated by the ratio between the firm’s total debt and operational
results (EBITDA), lagged by one period.
Firm collateral:
• Collateral - the ability to provide collateral when negotiating a bank loan limits
the losses to be faced by banks in the case of firm’s bankruptcy; the indicator
used in the analysis is the ratio between tangible assets and total assets.
We follow Ogawa & Suzuki (2000), Atanasova & Wilson (2004), Shikimi (2005),
and Kremp & Sevestre (2013), and do not consider the interest rate in the supply
function. In fact, it is considered that in a context of credit restrictions, banks first
decide on the amount they are willing to lend and then bargain the interest rate
with firms. This is founded on the theoretical model of Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) that
predicts that in the presence of credit market frictions, banks may decide not to
grant credit to borrowers with higher probability of default, even if they are willing
65
to pay the respective risk premium. The decision of granting credit to a firm is
determined by variables other than the interest rate, namely the firm idiosyncratic
characteristics, as suggested in the credit channel literature.
Finally, we also consider time and sectoral dummy variables to account for com-
mon shocks in the supply of credit and sectoral idiosyncratic characteristics constant
over time.
3.3 Some econometric questions
3.3.1 New loans
Using firm’s balance-sheet information to compute the amount of bank loans
does not allow to immediately identify new loans. In this paper, we follow the same
econometric strategy considered in Kremp & Sevestre (2013) and include in the
analysis a set of lagged terms of the dependent variable, calculated within the firms’
sector of activity and dimension category, imposing that the estimated coefficient is
the same in both the credit demand and credit supply equations. This is equivalent
to assume the relation NLit “ Lit ´ p1´ δgqLit´1, where δg is a reimbursement rate
assumed to be constant over time and common to firms within a given sector of
activity and dimension category.
3.3.2 Endogeneity and unobservable heterogeneity
Some of the variables included in the econometric model can raise endogeneity
problems. More precisely, we assume that the amount of collateral in the supply
equation, and investment, working capital needs, and the interest rate in the demand
equation, may be endogenous variables6. In fact, the firm’s amount of investment
and collateral may depend on the amount of the loan it was granted; likewise the
working capital needs and the accounts payable are likely to depend on the firm’s
6The firm’s amount of collateral, investment, working capital needs, and accounts payable are
measured in terms of total assets.
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activity levels that, in turn, may be affected by the firm’s access to bank loans. On
the other hand, the interest rate may also be endogenous because firms negotiate
with banks the loan amount as well as the price. To limit endogeneity problems
in the model estimation we follow the strategy used in Kremp & Sevestre (2013)
and developed by Rivers & Vuong (1988), which consists in the introduction of the
residuals of the estimation of each endogenous variable on a set of instruments (first
differences of the explanatory variables lagged one and two periods) in the equations
of credit demand and supply.
The firms’ unobservable characteristics that may influence the demand and sup-
ply of credit, and that are potentially correlated with the explanatory variables may
also raise an estimation issue. To account for the bias that omitted variables may
induce in the estimation, we include the sample averages of the explanatory vari-
ables as well as the first observation of the dependent variable in the equations of
demand and supply of new loans.
3.4 Credit rationing
The estimation of the equations for credit demand and supply allows us to cal-
culate in what extent Portuguese SMEs faced credit restrictions in the sampling
period. Based on these estimates, it is possible to identify which firms obtained a
loan but in a lower amount than that they applied for - intensive margin - and in
what extent firms that did not get any loan were fully rationed - extensive margin.
We follow Gersovitz (1980) and define the probability of credit rationing as
the probability that the latent credit demand is higher that the supply of credit,
conditional on the observed amount of loans:
PrpRationing|NLitq “
fspNLitqp1´ FdpNLitqq
fdpNLitqp1´ FspNLitqq ` fspNLitqp1´ FdpNLitqq
. (3.2)
We consider that a firm was affected by credit restrictions if this probability is
greater than 0.57.
7We considered different thresholds in a reasonable neighborhood of 0.5 and the results are
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To assess the extensive margin of credit rationing it is necessary to estimate an
interest rate for those firms with no bank loans. In the case of firms with no bank
loans in a given year but that have a positive amount of bank loans in other years,
the interest rate is calculated as follows:
piit “ iit´1 ˆ p1`∆rjtq, (3.3)
wherepiit is the estimated interest rate for firm i in year t, iit´1 is the last observation
of the firm’s interest rate, and ∆rjt is the average growth of the interest rate between
t´ 1 and t, calculated within activity sector and size dimension.
In the case of firms with no bank loans in the sampling period, the estimated
interest rate is the average interest rate calculated by size category and sector of
activity.
3.5 Data
The variables included in the analysis were computed using the Portuguese
dataset Simplified Corporate Information (Portuguese acronym for Informação Em-
presarial Simplificada - IES), which comprehends detailed balance-sheet information
on the universe of Portuguese non-financial corporations. This dataset is also the
data source for bank loans, and therefore it is not possible to decompose the total
amount of bank loans by bank. Consequently, the specification we developed for
credit supply does not take into consideration bank specific factors such as banks
solvency and liquidity positions. The IES information is available for the period
between 2005 and 2012. We consider a sample of Portuguese SMEs because these
are expected to be the most exposed to credit restrictions. The activity sectors
included in the analysis comprise the manufacturing industry, construction and real
estate, trade, and the different segments of services.
The relevant period for the estimation starts in 2010 because we impose that
firms stay at least for four consecutive years in the sample. This restriction is
qualitatively the same.
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justified by the inclusion of the first differences and the first and second lags of the
first differences in the estimation as instruments for the endogenous variables. We
considered the observations above the 99th percentile or below the 1st percentile as
outliers.
The sample includes 50,020 observations with positive bank loans and observed
interest rate. The main descriptive statistics associated with the variables considered
in the analysis are reported in Table 3.1. The sample is mostly constituted by
SMEs that belong to the trade and manufacturing industry sectors. Moreover, the
disinvestment of Portuguese SMEs is particularly evident over the sample period.
It is also possible to find that Portuguese SMEs mostly rely on bank loans and
accounts payable as financing sources of their activity. The firms’ non-financial debt
corresponds only to a small part of their total assets.
Table 3.1: Main descriptive statistics
Mean St. Dev. Q1 Q2 Q3
Total assets 1,938,798 11,900,000 231,248.1 558,436.7 1,456,533
Loans/Assets 0.248 0.170 0.110 0.222 0.358
EBITDA/Assets 0.059 0.133 0.036 0.068 0.113
Interest rate 0.051 0.045 0.023 0.041 0.065
Investment/Assets -0.014 0.078 -0.038 -0.014 0.001
Collateral/Assets 0.245 0.214 0.069 0.186 0.370
Non-financial debt/Assets 0.054 0.112 0.000 0.001 0.056
(Debt/EBITDA)t´1 2.857 7.994 0.846 2.487 5.098
Accounts payable/Assets 0.217 0.175 0.083 0.180 0.311
Working capital/Assets 0.299 0.257 0.117 0.293 0.480






Dummy Hotel and Restaurant 0.018
Dummy Info. and Communication 0.020
Dummy Services 0.145
Dummy Manufacturing industry 0.247
Notes: Number of observations: 52,020 (17,104 enterprises in 2010, 17,752 enterprises in 2011 e





The main estimation results of the equations of demand and supply of new loans
are presented in Table 3.28. The coefficients reported in the first column were ob-
tained assuming that credit demand and supply are independent (this corresponds
to the ρ “ 0 case, meaning that shocks in credit demand are not correlated with
shocks in credit supply) and those reported in the third column were obtained as-
suming that credit demand and supply may be correlated (and, therefore, ρ ‰ 0).
The coefficients are mostly statistically significant and have the expected sign, with
the exception of firm size in the credit supply equation.
Table 3.2: Estimation results
Supply equation Disequilibrium model Disequilibrium model
Demand and supply are independent Demand and supply are correlated
Coeff. St. Error Coeff. St. Error
Very small firms 0.0646˚˚˚ 0.0080 0.0346˚˚˚ 0.0051
Small firms 0.0384˚˚˚ 0.0081 0.0217˚˚˚ 0.0052
(Debt/EBITDA)t´1 -0.0017
˚˚˚ 0.0005 -0.0013˚˚˚ 0.0003
Collateral/Assets 1.6622˚˚˚ 0.0846 1.0843˚˚˚ 0.0549
Young SMEs -0.0259 0.0200 -0.0108 0.0130
Dummy 2010 -0.0880˚˚˚ 0.0080 -0.0556˚˚˚ 0.0054
Dummy 2011 0.0060 0.0090 -0.0045 0.0061
sigma s 0.1699˚˚˚ 0.0030 0.1274˚˚˚ 0.0019
8The remaining estimated coefficients are reported in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix.
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Demand equation Disequilibrium model Disequilibrium model
Demand and supply are independent Demand and supply are correlated
Coeff. St. Error Coeff. St. Error
Very small firms 0.0038 0.0025 0.0051˚ 0.0026
Small firms -0.0012˚˚˚ 0.0019 -0.0017 0.0020
Non-financial debt/Assets -0.5458˚˚˚ 0.0115 -0.5615˚˚˚ 0.0122
EBITDA/Assets -0.2893˚˚˚ 0.0077 -0.2988˚˚˚ 0.0084
Interest rate -0.7092˚˚˚ 0.0657 -0.7004˚˚˚ 0.0712
Accounts payable/Assets -0.0401˚˚ 0.0161 -0.0468˚˚˚ 0.0174
Working capital/Assets 0.0635˚˚˚ 0.0098 0.0628˚˚˚ 0.0106
Investment/Assets 0.0099 0.0366 0.0211 0.0384
Dummy 2010 0.0661˚˚˚ 0.0019 0.0771˚˚˚ 0.0024
Dummy 2011 -0.0044˚˚˚ 0.0013 -0.0048˚˚˚ 0.0014
sigma d 0.1009˚˚˚ 0.0004 0.0994˚˚˚ 0.0004
rho 0.4496˚˚˚ 0.0280
log-likelihood -45,959.53 -46,085.26
No. of observations 52,020 52,020
Notes: ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
The results of the estimation of the credit supply equation in both models suggest
that the credit ceiling is higher for firms of smaller dimension, controlling for the
other firm characteristics. The estimated coefficient for the ratio between debt and
operational results indicate that it is more difficult for indebted firms to access bank
loans. In fact, firms with a stronger relative weight of debt have less capacity to
generate cash-flows to reimburse the amount they have borrowed and have, therefore,
a higher risk of default. The availability of collateral is particularly important in
the banks’ decision to grant credit to firms. Firms that are able to provide better
guarantees when negotiating a bank loan are able to borrow significantly more from
banks. In turn, the results of the credit demand function estimation suggest that
credit demand strongly depends on the interest rate. The negative effect of the
amount of internal resources, as measured by the firm’s operational result, and the
amount of external resources (loans granted by shareholders and accounts payable)
is in line with the hypothesis that due to information asymmetries, firms prefer other
financing sources than bank loans (pecking order hypothesis).
The coefficient associated with investment is not statistically significant in both
specifications. On the other hand, working capital needs affect credit demand.
These two results may be related to some delay between granting credit and in-
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vestment but also suggest that firms have demanded credit mainly to finance their
operational activities rather than for investment projects. Moreover, this result in-
dicates that the slowdown in firms’ investment during the financial and economic
crisis in Portugal does not seem to be associated with credit restrictions, but with
lower credit demand by firms, perhaps justified by the uncertainty about the future
macroeconomic scenario.
Finally, in the model where credit demand and credit supply may be correlated
the estimates suggest that smaller firms are those that most seek bank loans. This
result is commonly found in the literature: smaller firms are not able to access
alternative financing sources and tend to rely more on bank loans (see, for example,
Gertler & Leahy (2008)).
3.6.2 Credit rationing
Table 3.3 presents the estimates associated with the probability that the latent
credit demand is higher than the credit supply, leading to the presence of credit
restrictions. The results for the intensive margin are reported in the first column and
represent the percentage of firms that (with probability greater than 0.5) obtained
a loan but in a lower amount than that they applied for, given the interest rate.
The results of full rationing are reported in the second column - extensive margin.
According to the results reported in the first column, approximately 15 percent of
SMEs with a bank loan were partially rationed. The firms that are mostly affected
by credit rationing are the younger ones, with approximately 26 percent, and the
smaller ones, with approximately 19 percent. The most affected activity sectors are
construction and trade (21 percent and 16 percent, respectively). The estimates
for the extensive margin are reported in the second column of Table 3.3. The
figures suggest that about 32 percent of Portuguese SMEs were affected by credit
restrictions and were not granted a loan even though their credit latent demand was
positive. Smaller and younger firms are the most affected, but the estimates for the
remaining dimension categories indicate that those were also considerably affected,
with approximately 23 percent of medium firms facing credit restrictions. All the
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activity sectors faced credit restrictions, with estimates between 31 and 41 percent.
Table 3.3: Estimates (probability of credit rationing)
Partial Full
(in % of firms with loans) (in % of firms with no loan)
SMEs 15% 32%
Very small firms 19% 35%
Small firms 13% 27%
Medium firms 9% 23%




Hotel and restaurant 9% 41%
Information and Communication 11% 32%




These findings contrast with the results presented by Kremp & Sevestre (2013)
for French SMEs. The main reason for this finding is twofold: on one hand, the an-
nual rate of change of total credit to Portuguese SMEs fell around 10 per cent by the
end of 2008 to approximately -5 per cent in mid-20129. Furthermore, the number of
new firms with access to credit decreased by more than half in the period between
2010 and 2012, according to the Portuguese Credit Register dataset, which suggests
that a considerable number of firms did not have access to credit in this period.
In fact, Portuguese banks faced increased deleveraging pressures and stricter mini-
mum capital requirements in the context of the Financial and Economic Assistance
Program, contributing to more restrictive credit standards and conditions applied
on loans. On the other hand, Portuguese SMEs seem to rely more on bank loans
as source of financing than French SMEs (as measured by the ratio between bank
loans and total assets, which is equal to 0.27 and 0.18 for the sample of Portuguese
and French SMEs in 2010, respectively). The results presented for partial and full
rationing of Portuguese SMEs are in line with the results on firms’ access to bank
loans of the ECB’s Survey on Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE).
9See Financial Stability Report, May 2013, Banco de Portugal.
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3.7 Conclusions
This study aims to identify the relative contribution of credit demand and supply
factors in explaining the evolution of new loans granted to Portuguese SMEs. We
voluntarily restrict the analysis to SMEs because we consider that larger firms have
easier access to financing sources other than loans granted by resident banks and
are, therefore, less exposed to credit restrictions. The methodology relies on the
estimation of credit demand and credit supply functions simultaneously, assuming
that the credit market may be in disequilibrium and, therefore, the interest rate
does not lead to equilibrium in the demand and supply of credit. This methodology
is particularly suitable since credit markets may be affected by information asym-
metries between debtors and creditors. The results suggest that during the financial
crisis Portuguese SMEs searched for bank loans mainly to finance their operational
activity and not for investment. The smaller firms and those with smaller amounts
of internal resources have higher demand for bank loans. In turn, firms with a higher
capacity to pay their debt and with more collateral can borrow more from banks.
The estimates relative to the intensive and extensive margins suggest that a signif-
icant fraction of Portuguese SMEs was affected by credit rationing. Furthermore,
the results suggest that smaller and younger firms were the most credit constrained.
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Appendix
Table A1 Estimation results
Other estimates Disequilibrium model Disequilibrium model
Demand and supply are independent Demand and supply are correlated
Coeff. St. Error Coeff. St. Error
Supply equation
Average (Debt/EBITDA)t´1 0.0030˚˚˚ 0.0006 0.0024˚˚˚ 0.0004
Average Young SMEs 0.0369 0.0295 0.0362˚ 0.0197
Average Collateral/Assets -0.2407˚˚˚ 0.0764 -0.3095˚˚˚ 0.0419
Instrument: Collateral. residuals -0.4670˚˚˚ 0.0358 -0.2681˚˚˚ 0.0227
Initial value of y -0.0749˚˚˚ 0.0134 -0.0359˚˚˚ 0.0089
Demand equation
Average Non-financial debt/Assets 0.4557˚˚˚ 0.0131 0.4706˚˚˚ 0.0140
Average EBITDA/Assets 0.1587˚˚˚ 0.0091 0.1565˚˚˚ 0.0100
Average Interest rate 0.5580˚˚˚ 0.0219 0.6273˚˚˚ 0.0256
Average Accounts payable/Assets 0.2721˚˚˚ 0.0118 0.2872˚˚˚ 0.0128
Average Investment/Assets -0.0097 0.0122 0.0045 0.0128
Average Working capital/Assets -0.0514˚˚˚ 0.0080 -0.0549˚˚˚ 0.0087
Instrument: Interest rate. residuals 0.0088 0.0649 -0.0523 0.0701
Instrument: Accounts payable. residuals -0.2668˚˚˚ 0.0127 -0.2748˚˚˚ 0.0139
Instrument: Investment. residuals 0.0463 0.0364 0.0258 0.0382
Instrument: Working capital. residuals -0.0060 0.0070 0.0001 0.0076
Initial value of y 0.0312˚˚˚ 0.0034 0.0306˚˚˚ 0.0037
Notes: ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table A2 Estimation results
Other estimates Disequilibrium model Disequilibrium model
Demand and supply are independent Demand and supply are correlated
Coeff. St. Error Coeff. St. Error
Supply equation
Dummy Construction 0.0894˚˚˚ 0.0088 0.0586˚˚˚ 0.0056
Dummy Trade 0.0667˚˚˚ 0.0074 0.0446˚˚˚ 0.0046
Dummy Hotel and restaurant -0.0545˚ 0.0307 -0.0482˚˚˚ 0.0173
Dummy Information and communication 0.1793˚˚˚ 0.0403 0.0916˚˚˚ 0.0164
Dummy Services 0.0336˚˚˚ 0.0095 0.0293˚˚˚ 0.0061
Demand equation
Dummy Construction 0.0131˚˚˚ 0.0030 0.0134˚˚˚ 0.0031
Dummy Trade -0.0034 0.0023 -0.0053˚˚ 0.0025
Dummy Hotel and restaurant -0.0401˚˚˚ 0.0067 0.0408˚˚˚ 0.0069
Dummy Information and communication 0.0232˚˚˚ 0.0067 0.0250˚˚˚ 0.0068
Dummy Services 0.0490˚˚˚ 0.0030 0.0482˚˚˚ 0.0032
Supply and demand equations
Lagged loans, small, manufacturing 0.7775˚˚˚ 0.0079 0.7665˚˚˚ 0.0079
Lagged loans, large, manufacturing 0.8410˚˚˚ 0.0059 0.8347˚˚˚ 0.0059
Lagged loans, small, construction 0.7281˚˚˚ 0.0088 0.7157˚˚˚ 0.0087
Lagged loans, large, construction 0.7813˚˚˚ 0.0086 0.7720˚˚˚ 0.0085
Lagged loans, small, trade 0.7779˚˚˚ 0.0051 0.7687˚˚˚ 0.0051
Lagged loans, large, trade 0.8229˚˚˚ 0.0058 0.8190˚˚˚ 0.0058
Lagged loans, small, hotel 0.7276˚˚˚ 0.0224 0.7126˚˚˚ 0.0220
Lagged loans, large, hotel 0.7514˚˚˚ 0.0179 0.7449˚˚˚ 0.0177
Lagged loans, small, information 0.7538˚˚˚ 0.0197 0.7394˚˚˚ 0.0196
Lagged loans, large, information 0.8027˚˚˚ 0.0222 0.7994˚˚˚ 0.0222
Lagged loans, small, services 0.7237˚˚˚ 0.0069 0.7150˚˚˚ 0.0069
Lagged loans, large, services 0.7776˚˚˚ 0.0082 0.7749˚˚˚ 0.0082
Notes: ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Stahl, Harald, et al. . 2005. The pricing behaviour of firms in the euro area: New
survey evidence. Banque de France Working Paper No. NER-E 135.
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